Showing posts with label Classification. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Classification. Show all posts

Friday, June 26, 2015

Wikileaks published some of the most secret NSA reports so far

(Updated: June 30, 2015)

Last Tuesday, June 23, the website Wikileaks (in cooperation with Libération and Mediapart) published a number of NSA-documents showing that between 2006 and 2012, NSA had been able to eavesdrop on the phone calls of three French presidents.

This is the first time we see actual finished intelligence reports that prove such eavesdropping, and being classified as TOP SECRET//COMINT-GAMMA they are much more sensitive than most of the documents from the Snowden-archive.

Also it seems that these new Wikileaks-documents are not from Snowden, but from another source, which could be the same as the one that leaked a database record about NSA's eavesdropping on German chancellor Merkel.

Update:
On Monday, June 29, Wikileaks published two Information Need (IN) requests and five additional intelligence reports, but the latter are not as highly classified as the ones revealed earlier.




NSA intelligence report about an intercepted conversation between French president
François Hollande and prime minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, May 22, 2012.
(Watermarked by Wikileaks - Click to enlarge)
 

Intelligence reports

The reports are from various editions of the "Global SIGINT Highlights - Executive Edition" briefings. Only one report is published in the original layout with header and a disclaimer, the other ones are just transcripts, probably because they are taken from pages that also contain reports about other countries. For Wikileaks it is very unusual to disclose documents in such a selective way.

The newsletter contains or is based upon so-called Serialized Reports, which are "the primary means by which NSA provides foreign intelligence information to intelligence users", most of whom are outside the SIGINT community. Such a report can be in electrical, hard-copy, video, or digital form.

The first five intelligence reports published by Wikileaks are:

2006:
Conversation between president Jacques Chirac and foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazy.
- Method: Unconventional
- Serial number: G/OO/6411-06, 271650Z
- Classification: Top Secret/Comint-Gamma

2008:
Positions of president Nicolas Sarkozy.
- Method: Unidentified
- Serial number: G/OO/503290-08, 291640Z
- Classification: Top Secret/Comint-Gamma

2010, March 24:
Conversation between the French ambassador in Washington Pierre Vimont and Sarkozy's diplomatic advisor Jean-David Levitte.
- Method: Unconventional
- Serial number: Z-3/OO/507179-10, 231635Z
- Classification: Top Secret/Comint

2011, June 11:
Conversation between president Nicolas Sarkozy and foreign minister Alain Juppé.
- Method: Unconventional
- Serial number: Z-G/OO/513370-11, 091416Z
- Classification: Top Secret/Comint-Gamma

2012, May 22:
Conversation between president François Hollande and prime minister Jean-Marc Ayrault.
- Method: Foreign satellite and Unconventional
- Serial numbers: Z-G/OO/503643-12, 211549Z and Z-G/OO/503541-12, 161711Z
- Classification: Top Secret/Comint-Gamma
 
Methods

For most of the five initial, and for all five additional reports, NSA's source of the intercepted communications is "Unconventional". It's not clear what that means, but phone calls between the president and his ministers will in most cases be handled by a local switch and therefore don't go through the intercontinental submarine fiber-optic cables, where they could pass NSA's conventional filter systems for telephone and internet traffic.

For intercepting this kind of foreign government phone calls, NSA would have to have access to the public telephone exchange(s) of Paris or the private branch exchanges (PBX) of the presidential palace and important government departments.

This would indeed require unconventional methods, like those conducted by the joint NSA-CIA units of the Special Collection Service (SCS) who operate from US embassies, or NSA's hacking division TAO.
Update:
According to a book by James Bamford, NSA had an Office of Unconventional Programs in the late 1990s, which in another book was presented as NSA's own equivalent of the SCS units. It is not known whether this office still exists or has evolved into another division.
A 2010 presentation (.pdf) says that RAMPART-A is "NSA's unconventional special access program". This is about cable tapping in cooperation with Third Party partner agencies, but seems not the means to get access to local government phone calls.

In one case, the source is "Foreign Satellite" (or FORNSAT), which is the traditional interception of the downlinks of communication satellites. This method was probably used because president Hollande visited his American counterpart in Washington a few days earlier.

In yet one other case, the method is "Unidentified", and although Wikileaks says it's about an "intercepted communication", the actual report only reflects the positions of president Sarkozy, without mentioning a conversation counterpart.



Google Earth view of the US embassy in Paris, where a joint NSA-CIA unit
of the SCS is stationed. The building in the center has a rooftop
structure that is probably used for spying purposes.
(Click to enlarge)


Classification

Looking at the classification level of the reports shows that they are TOP SECRET//COMINT-GAMMA when the president is involved in the conversation. Intercepted communications between ministers and/or top level advisors, diplomats and government officials are "only" classified as TOP SECRET//COMINT.

Three of the reports have the dissemination marking NOFORN, meaning they may not be released to foreigners. The other two may be released to officials with a need-to-know from agencies of the Five Eyes community.

Four of the reports also have the marking ORCON, meaning the originator controls dissemination of a document, for example by imposing that it has to be viewed in a secured area, or by not allowing copies to be made.


The GAMMA compartment

Probably most remarkable about these reports is that they are from the GAMMA compartment, which protects highly sensitive communication intercepts. It was already used in the late 1960s for intercepted phone calls from Soviet leaders.

The overwhelming majority of the Snowden-documents is classified TOP SECRET//COMINT, with COMINT being the control system for signals intelligence which covers almost anything the NSA does. All those powerpoint presentations, wiki pages and daily business reports are therefore not the agency's biggest secrets.

It is not clear whether Snowden had access to the GAMMA compartment. So far, no such documents have been published, except for five internal NSA Wiki pages, for which the highest possible classification was TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE/etc., but without GAMMA information being seen in them.

Only a few of the Snowden documents that have been published have a more special classification: we have seen a document from the STELLARWIND and the UMBRA control system, as well as from the ECI RAGTIME, but it is possible that Snowden found these as part of his task to move documents that were not in the right place, given their classification level.


Serial number & time stamp

Besides the source and the topic, there's also a serial number and a timestamp below each report. The time is presented according to the standard military notation. 161711Z for example stands for the 16th day, 17 hours and 11 minutes ZULU (= Greenwich Mean) Time, with the month and the year being that of the particular briefing.

The serial number is in the format for NSA's serialized reports, for example Z-G/OO/503643-12. According to the 2010 NSA SIGINT Reporter's Style and Usage Manual (.pdf), such a serial number consists of a code for the classification level, the Producer Designator Digraph (PDDG), a one-up annual number, and the last two digits of the year in which the report was issued. For the classification level, the following codes are known:

1 = Confidential(?)
2 = Secret
3 = Top Secret
 S = ?
E = ?
I = ?
 Z-G = Top Secret/Comint-Gamma
Z-3 = Top Secret/Comint


The Producer Designator Digraph (PDDG) consists of a combination of two letters and/or numbers and designates a particular "collector", but it's not clear what exactly that means. The serial numbers mentioned in the reports about France all have OO as PDDG. That one is not associated with a specific interception facility, and therefore it might be a dummy used to actually hide the source in reports for people outside the agency.


 

Tasking database records

Besides the NSA intelligence reports, Wikileaks also published an database extract which includes the (landline and/or mobile) phone numbers of significant French political and economic targets, including the office of the President.

Because this list is about phone numbers, it seems most likely from a database system codenamed OCTAVE, which kept the selectors used for instructing the various collection facilities. It was reportedly replaced by the Unified Targeting Tool (UTT) in 2011.



Entries from an NSA tasking database with French government targets
(Source: Wikileaks - Click to enlarge)


TOPI: Stands for Target Office of Primary Interest, which is the NSA unit in the Analysis & Production division where the interceptions are analysed and intelligence reports are produced. In the list we see the following TOPIs, all part of the so-called Product Line for International Security Issues (S2C):
S2C13: Europe, Strategic Partnerships & Energy SIGDEV *
S2C32: European States Branch
S2C51: (unknown)

Selector: Shows the particular identifier to select the communications that have to be collected, in this case a phone number. +33 is the country code for France, the third digit being a 1 means that it's a landline (Paris area code), being a 6 means it's a mobile phone.

Subscriber_ID: A description of the subscriber of the selector phone number:
- President of the Republic (cell phone)
- Presidential advisor for Africa (landline, date: 101215)
- Director for Global Public Property of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cell phone)
- Government communications center at the Elysée palace (landline)
- Diplomatic advisor at the Elysée palace (cell phone)
- Secretary general at the Elysée palace (cell phone)
- Spokesman of the foreign minister (cell phone)
- Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE, cell phone)
- Presidential advisor for Africa (landline, date: 101214)
- Secretary of State for European Affairs (cell phone)
- Secretary of State for Trade (cell phone)
- Ministry of Agriculture SWBD (landline)
- Ministry of Finance, Economy and Budget (landline, for S2C32)
- Ministry of Finance, Economy and Budget (landline, for S2C51)
- Government air transportation wing (landline)

Information_Need: The collection requirement derived from the National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL), which is a daily updated compendium of the tasks given to the various Signals Intelligence collection units around the world. These needs have a code number, consisting of the year in which the need was established, followed by a number that refers to a specific topic:
165: France: Political Affairs
204: France: Economic Developments
388: Germany: Political Affairs (see Merkel-entry below)
1136: European Union: Political Affairs
2777: Multi-country: International Finance developments
From all its allies, the US was most interested in France - according to the 1985 version of the NSRL, which fell in the hands of East Germany and was eventually returned in 1992.

TOPI_Add_Date: According to Wikileaks this is the date of tagging of the entry with the responsible TOPI. These dates seem to be in the format yymmdd, which means they are either December 14 or December 15, 2010.

Priority: The priority of the particular Information Need, likely derived from the National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF, a reconstruction of which can be found here). This is a huge list containing all countries and topics the US government wants to be informed about, and which prioritizes these topics with a number from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest). As we can see in the Wikileaks-list, for France, only the president and the director for global public property of the ministry of foreign affairs have priority 2, the rest is medium level 3.

IN_Explainer: Description of the Information_Need

 

A second source

The database entries published by Wikileaks are very similar to the database record that revealed NSA's intention of eavesdropping on German chancellor Merkel back in October 2013. This record contains the number of Merkel's non-secure cell phone and several other entries just like we saw in the Wikileaks list, but it also has some additional information:



Printed version of a transcription of an NSA database
record about German chancellor Merkel


Because for Merkel only this record was available, and no finished intelligence reports like those about the French presidents, there is no hard proof that NSA succesfully intercepted her communications.


What many people don't realize, is that this database record about Merkel wasn't from the Snowden-documents. Der Spiegel received it from another source that was never identified, which was confirmed by Glenn Greenwald and Bruce Schneier (this seems to exclude the option that someone with access to the Snowden-documents leaked this on his own).

Because the tasking records about France are very similar, and most likely from the same database as the one about chancellor Merkel, it's very well possible that they are from the same source. Because keeping an eye on foreign governments is a legitimate task, this source is not a whistleblower. He or she could be a cryptoanarchist, or maybe even an agent of a foreign intelligence agency.

Perhaps Wikileaks itself also doesn't know who the source is, because last May, it relaunched its secure TOR-based drop box that allows anonymous submissions of sensitive materials.

During his work for the NSA, Edward Snowden was not involved with European targets. He was based in Japan, and later in Hawaii, where they are responsible for the Pacific region. His last job was supporting the regional NSA/CSS Threat Operation Center (NTOC), which counters cyber threats.

This is reflected by the intercepted content that Snowden apparently did had (legal) access to, according to a report by The Washington Post from July 5, 2014. These intercepts came "from a repository hosted at the NSA’s Kunia regional facility in Hawaii, which was shared by a group of analysts who specialize in Southeast Asian threats and targets".

 

Some perspective

French prime minister Manuel Valls strongly condemned these spying activities, but that was of course just for show. France's own foreign intelligence service DGSE is well-known for its aggressive industrial espionage against American and German companies, and for example also targeted former US president George W. Bush and foreign secretary Madeleine Albright.

On the other hand, the French government was well aware of the security risks, as in 2010 it ordered over 14.000 secure mobile phones, to be used by the president, ministers and high officials of the armed forces and the various ministries that deal with classified defence information.

This highly secure TEOREM cell phone is manufactured by the French multinational defence company Thales, and the price of a single device is said to be around 1.500,- euros. Because the TEOREM has a rather old-fashioned design and the security features don't improve usability, it was apparently not used as often as it should be...



The TEOREM secure mobile phone made by Thales
(Source: Thales leaflet - Click to enlarge)


White House response

A spokesman of the US National Security Council (NSC) told the website Ars Technica that "we do not conduct any foreign intelligence surveillance activities unless there is a specific and validated national security purpose. This applies to ordinary citizens and world leaders alike". Later he added: "We are not targeting and will not target the communications of President Hollande."

Just as in the case of German chancellor Merkel, the past tense misses, which means the US government doesn't deny that the French president had been eavesdropped on in the past. But it seems that at least for the near future, both leaders will not be targeted by NSA anymore.



Links and sources
- Reuters.com: NSA wiretapped two French finance ministers: Wikileaks
- ArsTechnica.com: WikiLeaks publishes top secret NSA briefs showing US spied on France
- Wired.com: With its French NSA Leak, Wikileaks is Back
- Zeit.de: Was die Frankreich-Dokumente preisgeben
- LeMonde.fr: Trois présidents français espionnés par les Etats-Unis
- Tagesschau.de: NSA spähte Frankreichs Staatsspitze aus

- See also the thread on Hacker News

Monday, January 26, 2015

How GCHQ prepares for interception of phone calls from satellite links

(Updated: March 17, 2015)

Most of the Snowden-revelations are about spying on the internet, but NSA and GCHQ are also conducting the more traditional collection of telephone communications that go through satellite links.

What needs to be done before phone calls can be collected, can be learned from two highly detailed technical reports from the GCHQ listening station near Bude in the UK.

These reports were published on August 31 last year by the German magazine Der Spiegel and the website The Intercept as part of a story about how Turkey is both a partner and a target for US intelligence.

Here we will analyse what's in these reports, which give an interesting impression of the techniques used to transmit telephone communications over satellite links.



Satellite dishes at the GCHQ intercept station near Bude, Cornwall, UK


Officially, such technical reports are called "informal reports", as opposed to the "serialized reports" that contain finished intelligence information for end users outside the SIGINT community.

Until now, only two of such technical reports have been disclosed, but according to an article by Der Spiegel from December 20, 2013, they are from "a bundle of documents filled with international telephone numbers and corresponding annotations" from Sigint Development (SD), which is a unit that identifies and develops new targets.

The technical reports are about test runs for new, previously unmonitored communication paths intended to "highlight the possible intelligence value" and whether certain satellite links could be "of potential interest for tasking". The reports give no indication about whether the listed numbers were eventually tasked for collection and neither about the intensity and length of any such surveillance.


Der Spiegel says these documents show that GCHQ "at least intermittently, kept tabs on entire country-to-country satellite communication links, like Germany-Georgia and Germany-Turkey, for example, of certain providers", which sounds rather indiscriminate.

However, the fact that GCHQ analysts are sampling these satellite links on whether they contain target's phone numbers, shows they are looking for the most productive links to be eventually intercepted. During the parliamentary investigation in Germany, officials from BND explained a similar way of selecting specific channels of specific satellites.




Technical report nr. 35

The first technical report is number 35 from October 15, 2008. It is about four satellite links between the United Kingdom and Iraq, which were given the following case notations, starting with G2, which is NSA's identifier for the Intelsat 902 communications satellite:
- G2BCR (UK - Iraq)
- G2BBU (UK - Iraq)
- G2BCS (Iraq - UK)
- G2BBV (Iraq - UK)

The physical gateways (the satellite ground stations) for these satellite links are in the UK and in Iraq, with the UK station providing logical gateways to the Rest-of-the-World (ROW), mainly Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt.





Multiplexing and compression

By analysing the C7 channel (see below), it was confirmed that the two links from the UK to Iraq were load-sharing traffic between the Rest-of-the-World and Iraq, as was the case for the link originating in Iraq.

For an efficient transmission, the links are equipped with the DTX-600 Compression Gateway device, made by Dialogic. This is a high-capacity, multi-service, multi-rate voice and data compression system, which is able to simultaneously compress toll quality voice, fax, Voice Band Data (VBD), native data (for example, V.35), and signaling information:




This kind of voice compression equipment is installed at either end of long-distance links, like from communications satellites or submarine fiber-optic cables. Telecommunication companies try to pack as much capacity into as little physical space as possible, making it also more difficult for intelligence engineers to unpack it.


Signaling System No. 7

Most of the information in the report is derived from the so-called C7 channel. C7 is the British term for the Signaling System No. 7 as specified by ITU-T recommendations. In the US it is referred to as SS7 or CCSS7 (for Common Channel Signalling System 7).

SS7 is a set of protocols for setting up and routing telephone calls. In the SS6 and SS7 versions of this protocol, this signalling information is "out-of-band", which means it is carried in a separate signaling channel, in order to keep it apart from the end-user's audio path.

In other words, SS7 contains the metadata for telephone conversations, like the calling and the called phone numbers and a range of switching instructions. This makes the SS7 or C7 channel the first stop for intelligence agencies.


Analysis of the link

In order to see whether these four satellite links could contain traffic that is useful for foreign intelligence purposes, the analyst took some phone numbers from Iraq (country code 964), Iran (98), Syria (963) and the UK (44) and looked whether these appeared in the data of the C7 channel.

All four links had hits, both for the called and the calling number. These numbers were redacted by The Intercept, except for the terms "Non Op Kurdish Extremism" and [Kurdish] "Leadership". The report continues with a more detailed analysis of the links. As an example we look at the one between the UK and Iraq, which has the case notation G2BCR and was paired with G2BCS:

On this link, the C7 channel runs between end points that are designated with the Originating Point Code (OPC) 2-153-1 in the UK, and the Destination Point Code (DPC) 4-036-4 in Iraq. The switching device at the originating end is a Nokia DX220 ABS and at the destination end a Unid Exch.

The DTX-600 contains 11 active trunks for digital voice data that are compressed into packets of 10 milliseconds duration by using the audio data compression algorithm g.729. There is also one WC1A channel.

After decompression by a tool named SWORDFISH it came out that the location of the C7 channel is the "3rd Trunk BS19". Protocols used on this link were Cisco, IPv4, ICMP, TCP, UDP, GRE, ESP and PPTP. Similar analysis was done for the other three satellite links.



Intelsat communications satellite from the 900-series,
nine of which were launched in June 2001.


The report then has a small list of Technical Details, saying that the traffic goes via the Intelsat 902 communications satellite, but the exact frequencies of the four links are redacted, just like the Symbol Rate and the FEC Rate. FEC probably stands for Forward Error Correction, to mitigate for packet losses.

There is also a FEC RASIN number: TPC2D78R005. RASIN stands for RAdio-SIgnal Notation, which is a comprehensive, originally 10-volume NSA manual that lists the physical parameters of every known signal, all known communication links and how they are collected. It seems strange that this internal RASIN code is visible, while the FEC rate, which is common technology, is redacted.


Conclusion

The conclusion on whether these satellite links can be tasked on the collection system is: "Due to limited patching there is currently no spare tasking availability on Lopers". LOPERS is one of the main systems used by NSA for collecting telephone communications. According to Der Spiegel, some other reports concluded about tasking: "Not currently due to the data rate of the carriers."

Finally, this technical report gives the (redacted) contact details at OPA-BUDE, with OPA being the abbreviation of a yet unknown unit at the GCHQ Bude listening station in Cornwall. The last section of the report is fully blacked out by The Intercept, but the next report will show what is apparently covered there.



Technical report nr. 44

The second technical report is from December 1, 2008 and is about a satellite link between Jordan and Belgium. It has the case notation 8BBAC, with 8B being the identifier of a yet unknown communications satellite. The frequency of the link is redacted. The physical gateways are in Jordan and Belgium, with the Belgian station also providing a logical gateway to the Rest-of-the-World (ROW).





The link is an E1 carrier, which means it runs 2048 Megabit/second and has 32 timeslots (channels), which are numbered TS0 to TS31 (another widely used carrier is E3, which has an overall capacity of 34.368 Megabit/second and has 512 timeslots). Each timeslot can carry one phone call, so one E1 link can transmit up to 30 calls simultaneously. The remaining two timeslots are used for the signaling information.

The analyst found that in this case timeslots 30 and 31 were used to relay the C7 signaling information and that compression was achieved by the DTX-360B Digital Circuit Multiplication Equipment (DCME). Using this technique, one Intelsat communications satellite can relay up to 112.500 voice circuits (telephone calls) simultaneously.

The report also says that the "RLE to this link is believed to be 8BBNH. Currently in view at Sounder". RLE stands for Return Link End, which in this case would be the link back from Belgium to Jordan. SOUNDER is the covername for the GCHQ listening station at Ayios Nikolaos in Cyprus, which is apparently able to intercept the Intelsat downlink to Jordan.



The GCHQ intercept station Ayios Nikolaos (SIGAD: UKM-257) in Cyprus


Analysis of the link's metadata

The technical report says that on timeslot 30, the C7 channel runs between end points that are designated with the Originating Point Code (OPC) 4-032-5 at FAST Link GSM (now Zain) in Jordan, and the Destination Point Code (DPC) 2-014-7 at F Belgacom in Brussels, Belgium.

It's interesting to see Belgacom here, as from 2009, GCHQ got access to the cell phone roaming branch of this company by using the highly sophisticated Regin spyware suite.

From OPC 4-032-5 in Jordan, there were also transit calls via DPC 2-012-2 to some fourty countries all over the world. In addition to this, there were also transit calls to Mauritius, Finland, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Sweden, Syria and Iran via DPC 2-012-1.

On timeslot 31, the C7 channel runs between the end points 4-032-0 at FAST Link in Jordan, and 2-013-1 at F Belgacom in Brussels, Belgium. For this timeslot there were also two links with transit calls, via DPC 2-012-2 and DPC 2-012-1.

For these transit calls, the report also mentions an eight digit Circuit Identification Code (CIC). This code is used to connect the metadata in the C7 channel to the trunk and the timeslot which carry the voice part of the call. In this way, each of the 30 channels of an E1 link has a CIC associated with.

GCHQ has to know the CIC, in order to pick the right voice part from one of the content channels, after having found the target's phone number in the signaling channel.



Interface of an NSA tool with a page titled "SS7 Summary" which lists and visualizes
the number of OPC/DPC pairs accessible by various NSA fiber-optic cable
interception programs, identified by their SIGAD number.
(Screenshot from an NSA presentation
published in December 2013 - Click to enlarge)


Mapping the link

The analyst used the DEPTHGAUGE tool to map the 8BBAC satellite link. He reports that the resultant map was not fully conclusive, but that it supported the previously listed mapping. What follows is a list which seems to relate Circuit Identification Codes (CIC) to the specific TimeSlots (TS). Not all of them had yet been mapped.

The 8BBAC link was sampled for telephony data (DNR) for approximately 94 hours during the period from November 26 to December 1, 2008, by using a tool or system codenamed DRUMKIT.

Phone numbers listed in CORINTH, which could be GCHQ's telephony tasking database, were found 607 times in timeslot 30. This included both tasked and de-tasked numbers, which means numbers that were under surveillance as well as numbers for which the surveillance had been terminated. 26 numbers that were tasked at the time of the analysis had 86 hits.

In timeslot 31, there were 349 hits, 40 of which were from 14 phone numbers that were under surveillance. These hits could be viewed in DRUMROLL under the filenames 8BBAC0030 for timeslot 30 and 8BBAC0031 for timeslot 31.


DRUMROLL hits

The report lists all the hits of tasked, and a selection of the non-tasked phone numbers that were found in timeslot 30 and timeslot 31. These lists are completely blacked out, except for the terms "Turkish MFA" (= Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and "Kurdish Leadership".

According to The Intercept's reporting, NSA was regularly providing its Turkish partners with the mobile phone location data of PKK leaders, but was at the same time spying on the Turkish government.

DRUMROLL was first seen in snippets from a GCHQ document published by Der Spiegel in December 2013. It gave the hits for a satellite link with case notation 1ABCT. According to the Spiegel article, this was a communication path between Belgium and Africa.

For each of the entries there are codes or numbers under TNDEntry, TNDOffice, TNDtask and TNDzip. It is not known what TND stands for, but it could be something like Target Number Database.

Among the hits are European Union Commissioner Joaquin Almunia, the French oil and gas company Total E & P, the French transport company Thales Freight and Logistics and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. As such lists can show both tasked and de-tasked numbers, it's not clear whether these ones were still under surveillance; the N under TNDtask could stand for "Not Active":




The technical report nr. 44 from 2008 may have similar information in the lists that were redacted.

That report then continues with a small list of Technical Details of satellite link 8BBAC, with the Symbol Rate and the FEC Rate not being redacted, like in the first report. The conclusion of the report is that "this link can be tasked on the system". According to Der Spiegel this was the answer in many of the other reports too.

Finally, also readable unlike in the first report, is the standard disclaimer that is under every document from GCHQ. It says that this "information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK informataion legislation".

Apparently this time the editors from The Intercept forgot to redact the GCHQ's internal (non-secure) phone number and e-mail address for such disclosure requests, which normally appear blacked out in all GHCQ documents that have been disclosed.



Classification

All three technical reports we have seen are classified SECRET STRAP 1 SPOKE. The British marking STRAP 1 means that the dissemination of the document is restricted by measures from a three-level control system codenamed STRAP. Within that system, STRAP 1 is the lowest level.

More interesting is the NSA marking SPOKE, which also denotes a control system to limit access to the document, but is rarely seen. Other British documents marked STRAP 1 often have COMINT as their American equivalent, which is the general marking used for all information related to communications intelligence that hasn't to be more strictly controlled.

SPOKE is one of the codewords that NSA used in the past, but which were presumably abandoned in 1999. But from documents published as part of the Snowden-leaks we know that from these codewords at least SPOKE and UMBRA are still used.

Given what's in the known documents that have the SPOKE classification, it seems to cover technical information about targets, like their phone numbers and the communication links in which these can be found. The higher UMBRA marking is then probably used for the actual content, when this is collected outside the US under EO 12333 authority.

Update:
On March 12, 2015, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of the British Parliament published an extensive report about interception activities of the UK intelligence agencies, which says that GCHQ only collects data from a small number of fiber-optic cable channels ('bearers'), which are likely to contain traffic that is of intelligence value.


Links and Sources
- Wikipedia: ISDN User Part
- ZDNet.com: Invasive phone tracking: New SS7 research blows the lid off mobile security

Sunday, September 14, 2014

About STELLARWIND and other mysterious classification markings

(Updated: May 16, 2015)

Last week, on September 6, the US Justice Department released a declassified version of a 2004 memorandum about the STELLARWIND program.

The memorandum (pdf) is about the legality of STELLARWIND, which was a program under which NSA was authorized to collect content and metadata without the warrants that were needed previously.

Here we will not discuss the STELLARWIND program itself, but take a close look at the STELLARWIND classification marking, which causes some confusion. Also we learn about the existance of mysterious compartments that point to some highly sensitive but yet undisclosed interception programs.




Classification marking of the 2004 DoJ memorandum about STELLARWIND


The redacted markings

The first thing we see is that two portions of the classification marking have been blacked out:


1. The redacted space beween two double slashes

This is very strange, because according to the official classification manuals, there cannot be something between two double slashes in that position (see the chart below). The classification level (in this case: Top Secret) has to be followed by the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) control system (here: COMINT).

But as the US classification system is very complex, there are often minor mistakes in such classification lines. If we assume there was a mistake made here too, then the first term that has been blacked out could be another SCI compartment, which had to be followed by just a single slash (for example HCS for HUMINT Control System would fit the redacted space, although that marking itself isn't classified).

If there was no mistake, however, and the double slash is actually correct, then it would be a complete new category which isn't in the (public) classification manuals. This reminds of the UMBRA marking, which also appeared unexpectedly between double slashes in a classification line.



Overview of the categories and formatting for the US classification and control markings
From the Intelligence Community Classification Manual 6.0 from December 2013
(click to enlarge)



2. The redacted space directly after STELLARWIND

The second redaction starts right after the last letter of "STELLARWIND", thereby carefully hiding the category of the redacted marking, which is determined by how it is separated from the previous term. This could be by a slash, a double slash, a hyphen or a space, each indicating a different level.

In this case, the most likely option is that "STELLARWIND" is followed by a hyphen, which indicates the next term is another compartment under the COMINT control system, equal to STELLARWIND.

Classification manuals say there are undisclosed COMINT compartments which have identifiers consisting of three alphabetical characters. This would fit the redacted space as it would read like: "COMINT-STELLARWIND-ABC".

This undisclosed compartment probably also figured in some other declassified documents, where it sometimes seems to be accompanied by a sub-compartment which is identified by three numeric characters, like for example in this and this declaration where the marking could read like "COMINT-ABC 678":



Classified declaration of NSA director Alexander, April 20, 2007.


Looking at what was redacted in portions of both documents which were marked with this mysterious compartment, it seems that it's about at least two highly sensitive intelligence sources and methods. For example, pages 31-32 of this declaration (pdf) suggest that this might be obtaining metadata from specific telecom companies and search them for members or agents of particular target groups.



Classified declaration of Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte, May 12, 2006
TSP = Terrorist Surveillance Program; HCS = HUMINT Control System
Note that TSP and HCS are also between double slashes
(click to open the full document in pdf)


Markings with the mysterious undisclosed COMINT compartments weren't found on any of the Snowden-documents, but only on those that were declassified by the government, so it seems that Snowden had no access to information protected by these particular compartments.

The marking TSP (for Terrorist Surveillance Program), which is in some of the examples shown above, was used instead of STELLARWIND in briefing materials and documents intended for external audiences, such as Congress and the courts.



The STELLARWIND marking

So far, we looked at the two parts of the classification marking that were blacked out. But now we also have to look at the STELLARWIND marking itself, which wasn't redacted, but still causes confusion.

The classification marking of the 2004 memorandum of the Justice Department says "COMINT-STELLAR WIND" and according to the official formatting rules, this means that STELLARWIND would be part of the COMINT control system.

Note that the same memorandum had already been declassified upon a FOIA request by the ACLU in 2011, but in that version (pdf) the codeword STELLARWIND was still blacked out from the whole document. Both documents are compared here.



Classification marking of the 2004 DoJ memorandum about STELLARWIND


As COMINT is a control system for communications intercepts or Signals Intelligence, this seems to make sense. But what is confusing, is that the internal 2009 NSA classification guide (pdf) for the STELLARWIND program, which was disclosed by Edward Snowden, says something different.

Initially this guide calls STELLARWIND a "special compartment", but from the marking rules it becomes clear that it is treated as an SCI control system. Accordingly, the prescribed abbreviated marking reads: "TOP SECRET // STLW / SI // ORCON / NOFORN". In this way we can see STELLARWIND in the classification line of the following document:



Classification marking of a 2013 classified declaration (pdf) of DNI James Clapper
which was declassified on May 6, 2014
(click to enlarge)


In this document and also in a similar declaration (pdf) from 2013, the reason for the STELLARWIND classification is explained as follows:
"This declaration also contains information related to or derived from the STELLARWIND program, a controlled access signals intelligence program under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. In this declaration, information pertaining to the STELLARWIND program is denoted with the special marking "STLW" and requires more restrictive handling."


STELLARWIND is also being treated as a control system in the 2009 draft report about this program written by the NSA Inspector General, although its classification line is also somewhat sloppy: there are double slashes between STLW and COMINT (should just be a single one), and only a single one between COMINT and ORCON (where there should have been double slashes as both are from different categories):



Classification marking of the 2009 report about
STELLARWIND by the NSA Inspector General
(click to read the full document)


Throughout this document, the portion markings are also not always consistent. Most of them are "TS//SI//STLW//NF", but one or two times "TS//SI-STLW//NF". But as this report is a draft, it's possible that these things have been corrected in the final version, which hasn't been disclosed or declassified yet.

The 2009 Inspector General report about STELLARWIND was one of the first documents from the Snowden-leaks to be published, and it still is one of the most informative and detailed pieces about the development of NSA's interception efforts since 9/11.


Conclusion

In the end, it doesn't make much difference whether STELLARWIND is a control system on its own, or a sub-system of COMINT, but it is remarkable that for such an important program, the people involved apparently also weren't clear about it's exact status and how to put it in the right place of a classification line.

More important though is that the declassified documents show that besides the STELLARWIND program, there's at least one COMINT-compartment with at least one sub-compartment that protect similar or related NSA collection efforts which are considered even more sensitive, but about which we can only speculate.

 
UPDATE:

On April 24, 2015, the US government declassified a 2009 report by five Inspectors General about the STELLARWIND program, after a FOIA request by The New York Times. This report, which is over 700 pages long, has the overall classification "TOP SECRET // STLW // HCS / COMINT // ORCON / NOFORN":


The overall classification marking of the 2009 Inspectors General report
about STELLARWIND, with underneath the classification line and the
header of the report of the NSA Inspector General

Included in this report is the final version of the report of the NSA Inspector General, the draft version of which we discussed above. We see that in this final version, the classification line has been corrected: there's now a double slash between COMINT and ORCON, just like it should be.

This also means that the double slash between STLW and COMINT, which initially looked like a mistake, must be correct. We also see this double slash in the overall classification marking for the entire report (which has the additional HCS (HUMINT Control System) for information from the CIA).

Apparently STELLARWIND (STLW) was not an ordinary SCI control system (then there would have been only a single slash between STLW and COMINT), but a category on its own, or belongs to a category not mentioned in the publicly available government classification marking guides.

Update #2:
In a speech on May 15, 2015, former NSA Inspector General Joel Brenner said that STELLAR WIND "was not SAP’ed, because the creation of a new special access program requires Congressional notification, but it was run directly by the Office of the Vice President and put under the direct personal control of the Vice President’s counsel, David Addington" - which could maybe an explanation for the fact the program was or became a classification category on its own.


Tuesday, July 8, 2014

NSA still uses the UMBRA compartment for highly sensitive intercepts

(Updated: December 7, 2014)

Three days ago, on July 5, 2014, The Washington Post published some of the most important stories from the Snowden-leaks so far. It revealed that Snowden did had access to the content of data collected under FISA and FAA authority - a fact that had been kept secret until now. I'll come back on that main story later.

Here we will take a look at a remarkable detail from two slides that were also disclosed in the Post's article. The classification marking of these slides contains the codeword UMBRA, which was generally considered to be abolished in 1999, but now seems to be still in use. After going through several options, my conclusion is that UMBRA is most likely the codename of a so-called unpublished SCI control system.





"Target Package" prepared by the National Security Agency
prior to the capture of Abu Hamza in January 2011
(click to enlarge)


These slides are from a 2011 powerpoint presentation which details the plan to capture al-Qaeda facilitator Muhammad Tahir Shahzad and which pinpoints his location and his activities based upon intercepts from his various e-mail accounts. He was captured in Abbottabad the day after this presentation was finalized.


In the 2012 NRO Review and Redaction Guide (pdf) the existance of the UMBRA codeword is approved for public release, just like its paragraph portion marking TSC (for Top Secret Codeword). But as this manual also lists many revoked codewords, it is not conclusive about wether UMBRA is still used. One thing that is interesting though, is that the TSC portion marking would fit some of the redacted spaces in the newly disclosed slide:


Some possible options for the portion markings



Top Secret Codeword

UMBRA was one of three codewords that were used to protect sensitive intercepts of Communication Intelligence (COMINT). These codewords represented three levels of sensitivity:
- UMBRA for the most sensitive material (Category III)
- SPOKE for less sensitive material (Category II)
- MORAY for the least sensitive material (Category I)

These kind of codewords were used since the end of the 1950s World War II and together they were commonly called "Top Secret Codeword" (TSC), which was often seen as a level "above Top Secret", although it was actually more like a "vertical" division of the Top Secret-level. The codewords UMBRA, SPOKE and MORAY can be seen on many highly secret documents, a number of which have been declassified, like for example this statement from 1980 for a court case about NSA's information about UFOs:


(click for the full document as pdf-file)


According to instructions like these, the use of the codewords UMBRA, SPOKE and MORAY was terminated as of May 1999. From then on, the kind of information they were used for, had now to be protected by the general COMINT control system, or by specific compartments thereof for more sensitive information.
Update:
Since World War II, the NSA and her predecessors used codewords for protecting highly sensitive COMINT information and they were generally replaced by a new one every one or more years. The Top Secret codeword TRINE was compromised when the North Koreans captured the NSA spy ship USS Pueblo in 1968. TRINE was then replaced by UMBRA.


SPOKE

Very interesting is that not only UMBRA, but also the codeword SPOKE seems to be still in use. One document from the Snowden-leaks, which was published by Der Spiegel on December 20, 2013, is marked SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE. STRAP is the codeword that GCHQ uses to protect sensitive information, with STRAP1 denoting the least sensitive category:


Given the rather old-fashioned logo-type of the letters SD, it's not quite clear whether the document, or at least the header might predate 1999, although the content is clearly from more recent years. Der Spiegel said that it's an "analysis of the communication paths between Belgium and Africa prepared in January 2009".


Possible options

NSA using codewords that were generally considered abolished, reminds of a similar case in which the NOCON marking appeared in a document from the Snowden-trove. The general use of that marking was terminated in 1995, but NSA kept using it as an internal marking. As such it isn't listed in the official Classification Manuals, which are declassified regularly.

Now it seems that the same could have happened to the codewords UMBRA, SPOKE and maybe also to MORAY, but there's a difference: NOCON is a dissemination marking, a category which is less strictly controlled than a compartment, like UMBRA.

As the classification line of the newly disclosed slides seems not fully correct (there has to be a single, instead of a double slash between ORCON and REL USA, FVEY), which makes that there are a few options for what UMBRA could actually represent.



One option is that the double slash between COMINT and UMBRA is correct. In that case UMBRA wouldn't be a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) label for intelligence information - which it actually looks like most - but a codeword from another category, like for example a Special Access Program (SAP) or Foreign Government Information (FGI) (Marc Ambinder favors this option).

Another option is that there should have been just a single slash between both terms. That would mean UMBRA is a normal SCI control system, in this case one that is apparently kept secret, as it was never mentioned anywhere since 1999.

The latter option seems very well possible, because the most recent Intelligence Community Classification Manual (pdf) acknowledges the existance of "registered but unpublished SCI control systems" which "must remain unpublished due to sensitivity and restrictive access controls".

It seems less likely that UMBRA is the undisclosed compartment of the COMINT (SI) control system, which is listed in the most recent Intelligence Community Classification Manuals, because in that case the marking would have read TOP SECRET//COMINT-UMBRA//etc.

Questions

Given this sensitivity, one wonders why in the orange classification bars of the slides UMBRA hasn't been blacked out. The overall classification line in the first slide and also most of the portion markings were fully redacted, although the latter can hardly contain something that is more sensitive than the UMBRA abbreviation.

Another question is whether Edward Snowden had authorized access to the UMBRA compartment, or that he was able to just grab these slides otherwise. The Washington Post suggests that he did had access to the Exceptionally Controlled Information (ECI) compartment RAGTIME, which is similar to UMBRA, but for content collected under FISA authority (UMBRA is probably for content collected under EO 12333).


Conclusion

For those who are somehow familiar with the US classification system, it must be quite surprising to see a codeword that has been considered dead for 15 years popping up from the Snowden-leaks. The most likely explanation is that after UMBRA (and SPOKE too) was publicly abolished in 1999, NSA kept using it in secret as a compartment for very sensitive communication intercepts, but now as an unpublished SCI control system - letting outsiders think that UMBRA was something from the past!

Update:
On December 4, 2014, the website The Intercept came with a story about NSA mapping access options for mobile phone networks under the AURORAGOLD program. One of the NSA presentations about this program contains a slide which shows an example of an NSA serialized product report. The classification line of this report reads: TOP SECRET  UMBRA  US/UK/CAN/AUS/NZ EYES ONLY:




Links and Sources
- Lux ex Umbra: UMBRA history
- TheWeek.com: The return of an intelligence code word with a storied history
- A work of art from the series "Secret Codewords of the NSA": UMBRA
- William M. Arkin, Code Names, Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World, Steerforth Press, 2005.

Tuesday, December 24, 2013

The British classification marking STRAP

(Updated: November 26, 2014)

Most of the documents leaked by Edward Snowden are from the American signals intelligence agency NSA, but there are also quite a number from their British counterpart GCHQ. Documents from both countries are classified as TOP SECRET and often have additional markings to further restrict their dissemination.

Where on American documents we see markings like COMINT (Communications Intelligence) and NOFORN (No Foreign Nationals), the British have the mysterious term STRAP followed by a number.

Information about American classification and dissemination markings can rather easily be found on the internet (see also The US classification system on this weblog), but there are hardly any details about the British classification system.

But luckily, there's one source available which describes STRAP and other British classification practices in detail: the extensive Defence Manual of Security from 2001. Chapter 17 (page 1131-1135) of Volume 1 gives an overview of the STRAP Security Guidelines.



Compartmentalization

In the manual, STRAP is described as a set of nationally agreed principles and procedures to enhance the "need-to-know" protection of sensitive intelligence (and related operational information) produced by the British intelligence agencies, including military sources.

It adds additional procedures to the standard security measures employed for intelligence matters. STRAP is therefore comparable with the American system of protecting the most sensitive information by control systems with separate compartments, which are generally designated by codewords.

Although on some websites it's suggested that STRAP might stand for "STRategic Action Plan", the Defence Manual clearly states that STRAP is a codeword, not an acronym. The STRAP codeword itself is not classified.

Some intelligence information, handled within the STRAP System, require more stringent protection than others. To assure this, there are three levels of STRAP protection. These levels are designated, in ascending order of sensitivity and, hence, access control: STRAP 1, STRAP 2 and STRAP 3.



Examples of STRAP documents

An example of a document from the least sensitive category, marked STRAP 1, is a slide from a powerpoint presentation about the BULLRUN program aimed at breaking encryption methods used on the internet:




Information that is somewhat more sensitive is marked STRAP 2, like this presentation slide about operation SOCIALIST, which infiltrated the network of the Belgian telecommunications provider Belgacom:




From the category of most sensitive documents, marked STRAP 3, there are no actual examples available. STRAP 3 for example protects the precise locations where these interceptions takes place. The real names of the telecommunication companies that cooperate with GCHQ are classified one level below this, at STRAP 2.

As several of these real names have been published, Snowden must somehow got access even to STRAP 3 documents. Probably because they are so sensitive, Greenwald and the papers may have decided not to publish them, but only use some of the information they contain.



STRAP protection measures

The STRAP system is designed to protect information against threats that are specific for sensitive intelligence. A principal threat is when a target becomes aware of an intelligence attack against him, so he can initiate countermeasures. Therefore, the STRAP system aims to minimise the risk of leakage of sensitive intelligence operations and products into the public domain - whether by accidental exposure or deliberate intent. This is done through the following measures:

- Restricting access to sensitive intelligence material on a strict "need-to-know" basis;
- Agreeing the appropriate facilities for its protection in transit ("STRAP Channels") use, storage and disposal;
- Providing explicit briefings and guidance for individuals who handle this type of material.

Information that requires protection under the STRAP system has to be clearly defined and labelled with the appropriate STRAP level marking. It has to be carried by authorized couriers during transit, and signed receipts have to be obtained at all stages of handover.

Within the British Ministry of Defence, the implementation of the approved STRAP security measures is overseen by individually appointed STRAP Security Officers (STRAPSOs). The overall responsibility for the review and formulation of STRAP policy and guidelines is with the STRAP Management Board.



Friday, November 15, 2013

Five Eyes, 9-Eyes and many more

(Updated: January 22, 2014)

On November 2, The Guardian published a lenghty article about the Snowden-leaks, which said that besides the close intelligence-sharing group of the US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New-Zealand, known as 5-Eyes, there are also groups called 9-Eyes and 14-Eyes.

According to The Guardian, the first consists of the 5-Eyes countries plus Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway and the latter adding another five European nations. This caused some embarrassment, as especially France and The Netherlands were heavily opposed to NSA's eavesdropping operations.

For almost everyone the existance of these 'Eyes' came as a surprise, but as this article will show, there are also 3-, 4-, 6-, 7-, 8-, 9- and 10-Eyes communities. They were created for restricting access to military and intelligence information to respective numbers of coalition nations. These 'Eyes' are used as handling instructions and often supported by dedicated communication networks.





Many new 'Eyes'

First we take a look at what The Guardian wrote about the 9-Eyes and other intelligence-sharing groups:
"The NSA operates in close co-operation with four other English-speaking countries - the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - sharing raw intelligence, funding, technical systems and personnel. Their top level collective is known as the '5-Eyes'.

Beyond that, the NSA has other coalitions, although intelligence-sharing is more restricted for the additional partners: the 9-Eyes, which adds Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway; the 14-Eyes, including Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Sweden; and 41-Eyes, adding in others in the allied coalition in Afghanistan."

In a similar article, The New York Times also mentioned these two new Eyes-groups, but without naming the participating countries, and instead of the 41-Eyes, adding NACSI, the NATO Advisory Committee for Special Intelligence:
"More limited cooperation occurs with many more countries, including formal arrangements called Nine Eyes and 14 Eyes and Nacsi, an alliance of the agencies of 26 NATO countries".

These new revelations seem to be confirmed by what is said in an informative 2012 paper (pdf) about Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community:
"The Five Eyes sigint community also plays a ‘core’ role in a larger galaxy of sigint organizations found in established democratic states, both west and east. Five Eyes ‘plus’ gatherings in the west include Canada’s NATO allies and important non-NATO partners such as Sweden. To the east, a Pacific version of the Five Eyes ‘plus’ grouping includes, among others, Singapore and South Korea. Such extensions add ‘reach’ and ‘layering’ to Five Eyes sigint capabilities."

This text suggests that there are several western Five Eyes 'plus' groups, one of which sounds like the 14-Eyes mentioned by The Guardian. The eastern Five Eyes 'plus' refers to the 10-Eyes group, which will be described down below.

The existance of these hitherto unknown Eyes-groups came as a surprise, because it was generally assumed that NSA only had two kinds of partners for sharing signals intelligence:

- 2nd Party: the Five Eyes based upon the UKUSA-Agreement of 1946
- 3rd Party: a range of countries that have bilateral agreements with NSA



The CFBL Network

The term 9-Eyes could already be found in some other sources. One is an extensive article by the French weblog Zone d'Intérêt about the NATO exercise Empire Challenge 2008 (EC08), in which a number of operational and testing networks were used. One of them is the Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network (CFBLNet), which is for research, development and testing on command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.

The CFBL network consists of an unclassified (black) backbone network (the Blackbone) with transporting the encrypted traffic of several classified and unclassified enclaves as its main purpose. The main secure domains on the CFBL Blackbone are:
- The CFBLNet Unclassified Enclave (CUE), which is unclassified, but traffic is secured using 128 bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption.

- The Four-Eyes Enclave (FEE), which is a classified enclave at the SECRET level, accessible for USA, GBR, CAN and AUS only. This enclave was moved from behind the BLUE enclave to the Blackbone in 2006.

- The 6-Eyes or BLUE Enclave, which is a classified enclave at the SECRET level, accessible for the Five Eyes plus NATO (see paragraph about 6, 8 and 10-Eyes)

- The 9-Eyes or NATO RED Enclave, which is also a classified enclave at the SECRET level, accessible for the NATO members of the Five Eyes plus France, Germany, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands and Norway. This enclave was established in 2006 for classified initiatives among NATO members.

- The Initiative Enclaves, which are created temporarily to support specific initiatives and are classified according to the initiative requirements.

We can see these parts of the CFBL Network mentioned in this slide about the networks used in the EC08 exercise:



The various networks involved in Empire Challenge 2008 (EC08)
(COI = Community of Interest, CFE = CENTRIXS Four Eyes,
DDTE = Distributed Development and Test Enterprise)
(full presentation: EC08 Networks (pdf), May 2008)


The 9-Eyes countries are also listed in a table in a NATO standardization document (pdf) from 2010. There we see that from the 4-Eyes only the US, the UK and Canada are part of the 9-Eyes, which makes sense, as Australia is not a NATO partner:




This table lists the groups of nations to which some specific multi-national intelligence and reconnaissance information can be released. This is shown by using the dissemination markings or handling instructions: REL NATO, REL 4-EYES, REL 9-EYES.

The famous Five Eyes term also has its origins in the former NSA dissemination marking EYES ONLY, which defined which 'eyes' may see certain material. Accordingly, documents authorized for release to the five UKUSA-countries were initially marked as AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY.

In conversations, allied intelligence personnel adopted the term "Five Eyes" as a shorthand because it was much easier to say. This term became widely used and even got its own abbreviation: FVEY, which is now used in REL FVEY, after the EYES ONLY marking was being replaced by the REL TO [country/coalition designator] format.


A classification line showing the REL FVEY marking



Two different 9-Eyes?

If we compare the nine members of the CFBLNet NATO domain with the 9-Eyes countries mentioned in The Guardian article, we see some differences:

CFBLNet/NATO:
USA, GBR, CAN, FRA, DEU, ITA, NLD, NOR, ESP

The Guardian:
USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, NZL, FRA, DNK, NLD, NOR

From the European NATO countries, France, The Netherlands and Norway are in both lists. The Guardian adds Denmark and the non-NATO members of the Five Eyes, which leaves Germany, Italy and Spain out.

Especially Germany and Italy not being included in this apparently close alliance seems strange, as both countries participate in other coalition groups and are both considered to be 3rd party partners of NSA. Maybe this explains Germany being "a little grumpy at not being invited to join the 9-Eyes group" as The Guardian read in GCHQ documents.

Unfortunately, The Guardian failed to provide any context or even a time period for their 9-Eyes and 14-Eyes listings, which makes it quite difficult to find an explanation for the different membership countries of these groups.

At first sight it seems there are two different 9-Eyes groups: one apparently closely related to NSA, and another one as a sharing group in the CFBLNet environment. But as 9-Eyes is used as a handling instruction for classified information, it has to be perfectly clear to which group of countries information marked REL 9-EYES may be released. Therefore we have to assume there can be only one 9-Eyes group at a time.

The 9-Eyes NATO group of the CFBL network was first mentioned in 2008 and still comprised the same nations in 2012. In the meantime, Sweden also became a full member of CFBLNet, but not being a NATO member, it wasn't included in the 9-Eyes sharing group.



The CFBLNet countries in 2009, with three of the Five Eyes countries (yellow line),
six European NATO countries and the NATO organization (black line),
six NATO guest nations (dotted line) and two non-NATO countries.
(source: NATO Education and Training Network (pdf), 2012)


One option to explain the differences between the two 9-Eyes could be changing membership, with countries added or removed on an annual basis depending on their participation in the CFBLNet. But this also wouldn't fit with the Guardian's list, as Australia and New Zealand are no NATO-members and Denmark is not a fully participating member nation of the CFBL network.

Unless The Guardian misinterpreted the Snowden-documents, it seems quite unlikely that their 9-Eyes could be the same as the NATO 9-Eyes on the CFBL network, but it seems also unlikely that there are two groups called 9-Eyes at the same time. The best guess at this moment would be that the Guardian's 9-Eyes was a group that only existed somewhere before the NATO group was formed.

Update:
From remarks made on Twitter by a Dutch journalist who works on the Snowden-papers, it seems that the 9-Eyes is a group for exchanging military signals intelligence related to operations in Afghanistan.


There's also the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC), which is a forum for identifying interoperability issues and articulating actions to enhance coalition operations. It started in 1999 as the Six Nation Council and now has seven members: the US, Canada, Australia, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. It might be this group which is called 7-Eyes.

Also interesting is Alliance Base, which was the cover name for a secret Counterterrorist Intelligence Center (CTIC) that existed between 2002 and 2009. It was based in Paris and was a cooperation between six countries: the US, Canada, Australia, Britain, France and Germany. There's no indication this group was designated by a number of 'Eyes'.



The 14-Eyes and 3rd and 4th party partners

Now let's take a look at the 14-Eyes community, which was revealed for the first time by The Guardian. Looking at the number and the participating countries, it comes very close to CFBLNet, which had 13 full members (12 nations + the NATO organization) since 2010. But there are also some differences again:

CFBLNet members:
USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, NZL, FRA, DEU, NLD, NOR, ESP, ITA, SWE

The Guardian:
USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, NZL, FRA, DEU, DNK, NLD, NOR, ESP, ITA, BEL, SWE

These lists are very similar, except that Denmark and Belgium, which are on the Guardian's list, are not a (full) member of CFBLNet. Maybe these two countries joined CFBLNet only very recently, and in that case the 14-Eyes could refer to this group. It does show though that these NATO countries (and Sweden) are cooperating in additional information-sharing initiatives.

The exact purpose of such a cooperation in the 14-Eyes group isn't clear. The New York Times only says that the nations comprising the 9-Eyes and 14-Eyes groups have formal arrangements with NSA, which is something that also makes a country a traditional 3rd party partner.

According to Snowden-documents, about 30 countries have this status, but so far only the names of Germany, France, Austria, Denmark, Belgium and Poland were published. Some other sources say that Norway, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, South-Korea, Taiwan, Israel and South Africa are 3rd party partners too.

If we compare this to the 14-Eyes, we see that only France, Germany, Norway, Italy, Belgium and probably Spain are known 3rd party partners. Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands are not, but it's assumed they had or have less formal arrangements for exchanging SIGINT and cryptologic information with NSA. This also applies to Finland and Taiwan, and therefore these countries are sometimes called 4th party partners.

It seems there are roughly three possibilities:

A. All countries of the 14-Eyes (and subsequently those of the 9-Eyes) are actually 3rd party partners, because of having formal arrangements with NSA. Which means Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands must have acquired that position in recent years. Grouping them in two 'Eyes' would only make sense if that's for some specific initiatives.

B. Countries belonging to the 9-Eyes and 14-Eyes have a more close relationship with NSA and are therefore somewhere in between the 2nd party and the 3rd party nations. This is what both papers suggest, but it seems not very likely that relationships like these allow that much of (formal) refinement.

C. The 9-Eyes and 14-Eyes are groups created for specific goals and consist of the Five Eyes with some additional 3rd and 4th party nations, depending on whether their participation is needed for achieving those goals.

Update:
A newly disclosed document has shown that all countries of the 14-Eyes are 3rd Party partners of NSA and that the actual name of this group is SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR). More about this: 14-Eyes are 3rd Party partner forming the SIGINT Seniors Europe

In 2010, France was apperently ready to join the Five Eyes, but at the last moment the Obama White House said no.


The CFBL Network

The Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network (CFBL or CFBLNet) is a distributed Wide Area Network (WAN), which allows for the testing of new multinational information-sharing capabilities before they're transitioned to the actual operational networks which are used worldwide to support Combatant Command operations. CFBLNet enables the sharing and exchange of information on experimentation and interoperability testing.

Each member nation operates several "Battle Lab" sites which are hook into the CFBLNet backbone at a national Point-of-Presence (PoP). In 2012 there were 247 sites divided over 12 countries. The backbone traffic is secured with TCE621 (in Europe) and TACLANE E100 (or KG-175 in the US) network encryptors. The Multinational Information Sharing Program Management Office (MNIS PMO) maintains day-to-day control and coordination of the network.

Every year, also several other NATO countries participate or observe as guest nations in one or more CFBLNet initiatives at existing lab sites.

The CFBLNet grew out the network designed to support the US Joint Warfighter Interoperability Demonstrations (JWID), which used to build a support network for the period of the demonstrations and tear it down afterwards. In 1999, the JWID exercise used, for the first time, a permanent infrastructure that became what is now called the Combined Federated Battle Lab Network (CFBLNet), as established by the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3B) in 2001.



The 6, 8 and 10 Eyes

Creating separate access groups for coalition operations, and describing them with a certain number of 'Eyes' can be traced back to the early years of this century. The first occasion seems to have been the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 2003 in which also non-traditional partner countries were added to the communications network used by the UKUSA and NATO coalition.

Information sharing between different groups of coalition partners required that separate domains had to be created within one network: in 2003, the 5-Eyes countries and the NATO organization comprised the 6-Eyes domain, while these six members plus four Pacific Rim nations (Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Singapore) comprised the 10-Eyes domain. Each domain had its own Type-2/3DES-encrypted Virtual Private Network (VPN) which ran over a network secured by classified Type-1 encryption algorithms.



Slide with an overview of the 6-Eyes and 10-Eyes network domains
(full presentation: Agile Coalition Environment (pdf), 2003)


The 2004 edition of the Joint Warfighter Interoperability Demonstration also involved South-Korea, officially known as the Republic of Korea (ROK). To this end, three separate domains within CFBLNet were created and organized into two classification levels named 6-Eyes and 8-Eyes. The 8-Eyes domain consisted of the 6-Eyes countries plus NATO and ROK. The ROK domain was cryptographically isolated from the rest of CFBLNet by using TACLANE encryptors with Type-1 algorithms.



The 5, 4 and 3 Eyes

The long-standing and close intelligence-sharing community of the Five Eyes was downsized on two occasions. First in 1985, when New Zealand refused US nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships to visit its ports. As a result, the island was cut out of most intelligence arrangements led by the US. Some SIGINT was still being shared, but New Zealand got no American HUMINT or military intelligence anymore, except for operations in which it's actually participating.

Things not to be shared with New Zealand, were 4-Eyes only now. Staying outside most of the allied military operations, New Zealand was also not connected to the CENTRIXS Four Eyes (CFE) network (also called X-Net), which was created in 2001 and is extensively used for operational coordination between the remaining four partners: Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the US. Sites on this network have addresses in the format www.website.xnet.mnf

For information sharing and exchange between these nations, there's also a separate network codenamed STONEGHOST, which is maintained by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This network was previously called Intelink-C, which runs over it, and is now sometimes referred to as Q-Lat or Quad link. Information restricted to the 4-Eyes partners is marked with their respective country codes or the abbreviation thereof: ACGU.


A document showing the REL TO USA ACGU marking (source)


For collaborative planning at the strategic level there's another network called Pegasus (until 2010: GRIFFIN), which provides secure e-mail, chat and VoSIP communications for the 5-Eyes partners, as the military cooperation between the US and New Zealand was restored again in 2007. Probably by then, a separate network called CENTRIXS-NZ was set up, which connects the Four Eyes with New Zealand. Sharing intelligence information between the US and the Five Eyes is done through NSANet, which is a TS/SCI network controlled by NSA.

Another sub-group of the Five Eyes was formed when Canada didn't join the US in the 2003 war against Iraq. With New Zealand also not formally engaging, the 5-Eyes were now reduced to just 3-Eyes: the United States, Great Britain and Australia.
The relationship between these three countries became closer as both Britain and Australia were granted an upgrade of their intelligence access by president George W. Bush: both countries were granted (temporary and limited) access to America's classified SIPRNet for certain joint missions. This also reflects their bigger SIGINT collecting capabilities, compared to those of Canada and New Zealand.

> See for the latest: NSA's foreign partnerships


CENTRIXS networks

The main US-led multinational coalition networks are called CENTRIXS, which stands for Combined ENTerprise Regional Information eXchange System. It's a secure wide area network (WAN) architecture, which can be established according to the demands of a particular coalition exercise or operation. CENTRIXS supports intelligence and operations information sharing at the SECRET REL TO [country/coalition designator] level. Some notable CENTRIXS networks are:

- CENTRIXS Four Eyes (CFE) for the US, Britain, Canada and Australia.
- CENTRIXS-NZ for the Four Eyes plus New Zealand.
- CENTRIXS-JPN for the United States and Japan.
- CENTRIXS-K for the United States and South-Korea.
- CENTRIXS-PHI for the United States and the Philippines.
- CENTRIXS-CNFC for the Combined Naval Forces CENTCOM (VPN within GCTF).
- CENTRIXS-MCFI for the Multinational Coalition Forces Iraq.
- CENTRIXS-ISAF (CX-I) which is the US component of the Afghan Mission Network to share critical battlefield information among 50 coalition partners.
- CENTRIXS-GCTF (CX-G) for the Global Counter Terrorism Forces, which is the US coalition network in Afghanistan to share information among more than 80 Troop Contributing Nations.

The countries connected to CENTRIXS-ISAF can be recognized as the 41-Eyes of the allied coalition in Afghanistan mentioned by The Guardian. This group grew slowly and was called 43-Eyes in 2010, when the NATO exercise Empire Challenge 2010 (EC10) changed its "main participating security domain" to "an International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) equivalent 43-Eyes domain".

Probably also because of the steadily increasing number of coalition partners, shareable information is not marked with REL [..] EYES anymore, but with REL ISAF and REL GCTF.



Slide showing the complexity of multi-national information sharing
(full presentation: MultiNational Information Sharing (pdf), 2011)



Conclusion

We have seen that designations consisting of a number of 'Eyes' are used as a dissemination marking or handling instruction showing among which group of countries specific military or intelligence information may be shared.

The Guardian and the New York Times listed various 'Eyes' and some other groups in a way that suggests a hierarchy of how close their relationship with NSA would be: first the Five Eyes community, followed by 9-Eyes, 14-Eyes, NACSI, and with the 41-Eyes Afghanistan coalition being the loosest kind of cooperation.

A scheme like this looks attractive, but is at least partially misleading. For sure the Five Eyes are cooperating in the closest way, but the other groups have different scopes. NACSI is more like an advisory working group of NATO than an alliance of signal intelligence agencies, and the 41/43-Eyes community is for sharing battlefield information between members of the Afghanistan coalition.

Regarding the 9-Eyes and 14-Eyes communities, it's now up to journalists who have access to the Snowden-documents to provide more detailed information about whether they really represent more close alliances with NSA, or whether they're just 'working groups' of selected 3rd and 4th party nations, like most of the other 'Eyes' communities.

Update #1:
A newly disclosed document has shown that all countries of the 14-Eyes are 3rd Party partners of NSA and that the actual name of this group is SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR). More about this: 14-Eyes are 3rd Party partner forming the SIGINT Seniors Europe

Update #2:
From remarks made on Twitter by a Dutch journalist who works on the Snowden-papers, it seems that the 9-Eyes is a group for exchanging military signals intelligence related to operations in Afghanistan.



Summary of all known 'Eyes'

- 3-Eyes: USA, GBR, AUS (TEYE)
- 4-Eyes: USA, GBR, CAN, AUS (ACGU)
- 5-Eyes: USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, NZL (FVEY)
- 6-Eyes: USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, NZL, NATO
- 7-Eyes: USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, FRA, DEU, ITA (MIC?)
- 8-Eyes: USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, NZL, NATO, ?, South-Korea
- 9-Eyes: USA, GBR, CAN, FRA, DEU, ITA, NLD, NOR, ESP (CFBLNet)
- 9-Eyes: Five Eyes + FRA, DNK, NLD, NOR (Guardian)
- 10-Eyes: USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, NZL, NATO, Japan, South-Korea, Thailand, Singapore
- 14-Eyes: Five Eyes + FRA, DNK, NLD, NOR, DEU, ESP, ITA, BEL, SWE (SSEUR)
- 41-Eyes: ISAF-countries in ? (Guardian)
- 43-Eyes: ISAF-countries in 2010



Links and Sources
- DeCorrespondent.nl: Over Five Eyes en Third Parties - Met wie werkt de NSA samen (2013)
- Privacy International report: Eyes Wide Open (pdf)
- DailyDot.com: How the NSA ranks its international spying partners
- Disa.mil: Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS)
- Article in French about Empire Challenge 2008
- The 2004 listing of Country Code Trigraphs and Coalition Tetragraphs (pdf)
- About Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community (pdf)
- Far-Reaching Scenario Reflects Changing World (2003)
- Article about CENTRIXS-Maritime: connecting the warfighter
- Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN)/Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) (pdf)
- The 1999 DMS GENSER Message Security Classifications, Categories, and Marking Phrase Requirements (pdf)