Friday, September 13, 2013

The US Classification System

(Updated: May 26, 2015)

Top level telecommunications often involve information that has to be kept secret. To ensure that, governments have systems to protect sensitive information by classifying it, which is best known from document markings like "Top Secret".

Here we'll explain the classification system of the United States, which is far more complex than most people think, also because it's one of the world's biggest secrecy systems. In 2012 almost 5 million (!) people in the US had a clearance for access to classified information.*

The deeper parts of this classification system are classified, but some new details and codewords have been revealed in documents from the recent Snowden-leaks.



Classification markings

All documents that contain classified information, whether digital or hard copy, have to be marked with the appropriate markings. These are shown in the classification or banner line, which is shown at the top and bottom of every document and usually has three parts, separated by double slashes:


An example of such a classification line would be:

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN


Additionally, all sections of a document should have a portion marking, which is an abbreviation of the full classification line. Below, the abbreviations for these portion markings are shown in brackets.

When a document contains joint or Foreign Government Information (FGI), the necessary markings are shown in a separate part of the classification line. Finally declassification instructions can be added. These markings will not be discussed here.

The meaning of abbreviations and codewords can be found in the separate listing of Abbreviations and Acronyms and the listing of Nicknames and Codewords.



Overview of the categories and formatting for the US classification and control markings
From the Intelligence Community Classification Manual 6.0 from December 2013
(click to enlarge)



Classification levels

The United States government classifies information according to the degree which the unauthorized disclosure would damage national security. Like many other countries, the US has three classifications levels. From the highest to the lowest level these are:

- TOP SECRET (TS, color code: Orange)
- SECRET (S, color code: Red)
- CONFIDENTIAL (C, color code: Blue)

Government documents that do not have a classification can be marked as:
- UNCLASSIFIED (U, color code: Green)


With 1.4 million people having a Top Secret clearance, it's obvious that additional measures are needed to protect the more sensitive information. Therefore, that information is put in separated compartments, only accessible for those people who have the 'need-to-know'.

This system is called Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) for intelligence information, while other highly secret and sensitive information is protected by a Special Access Program (SAP). Both sub-systems will be explained below.

The classification levels Confidential, Secret and Top Secret are sometimes called 'Collateral', denoting that no additional Intelligence Community control systems or compartmentations, like SCI or SAP, apply.



SCI compartments

Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is a system to protect national intelligence information concerning sources and methods, and is divided into control systems and compartments, which are further subdivided in subcontrol systems and subcompartments. These systems and compartments are usually identified by a classified codeword, some of which were leaked or have been declassified. In total, there may be between 100 and 300 SCI compartments and subcompartments, grouped into about two dozen control systems.

Known and supposed SCI control systems from past and present are:


- COMINT or Special Intelligence (SI)
- UMBRA (TSC?)
- ENDSEAL (EL)
- TALENT KEYHOLE (TK)
- HUMINT Control System (HCS)
- KLONDIKE (KDK, since 2011)
- RESERVE (RSV, since 2005)
- BYEMAN (BYE or B, defunct since 2005)
- Special Navy Control Program (SNCP)
- VERDANT (VER, defunct)
- PANGRAM (PM, defunct)
- MEDITATE (M, defunct)
- SPECTRE
- LOMA
- KLAMATH (KLM)
- CREDIBLE WOLF (CW)
- FOCAL POINT (FP)
- AZURE BLUE (AB)
- ? (GG)
- ? (CRU)
- ? (OC)
- STELLARWIND (STLW, 2001-2009)

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//SI

Multiple control systems are shown like: TOP SECRET//SI/TK


COMINT / Special Intelligence (SI)
This control system is for communications intercepts or Signals Intelligence and contains various sub-control systems and compartments, which are identified by an abbreviation or a codeword. In a classification line they follow COMINT or SI, connected by a hyphen.

Known COMINT/SI sub-control systems are:
- Very Restricted Knowledge (VRK)
- Exceptionally Controlled Information (ECI)
- GAMMA (G)
- DELTA (D, defunct)
- [undisclosed]

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//SI-G

Multiple COMINT compartments shown like: TOP SECRET//SI-VRK-G

Very Restricted Knowledge (VRK)
This sub-control system was established in 1974 to limit access to uniquely sensitive COMINT activities and programs (no product or content). It contains compartments or categories which have an identifier of one to three alpha numeric characters.* Maybe VRK has been superseded by ECI.

Example: TOP SECRET//SI-VRK 11A

Exceptionally Controlled Information (ECI)
This sub-control system protects highly sensitive information and sources and contains compartments, which are identified by a classified codeword. In the classification line there's a three-letter abbreviation of this codeword.

Recently disclosed codewords for ECI compartments include:
- AMBULANT (AMB), APERIODIC, AUNTIE, ESCAPEE? (ESC), PAINTEDEAGLE, PAWLEYS, PENDLETON, PIEDMONT, PICARESQUE (PIQ), PITCHFORD, RAGTIME (RGT), REDHARVEST (RDV), WHIPGENIE (WPG).
Lists of ECI compartments from 2003 and 2013.

Example: TOP SECRET//SI-ECI PIQ

Multiple compartments: TOP SECRET//SI-ECI PIQ-ECI AMB

Since 2011, SCI type indicators used to group compartments, like ECI, may not be used anymore in classification lines and portion markings. For example, information formerly marked TS//SI-ECI ABC must now be marked TS//SI-ABC.

GAMMA (G)
This sub-control system of SI is for highly sensitive communication intercepts (product or content)* and may contain compartments, which are identified by a codeword or an identifier of four alphabetic characters.

Some former GAMMA compartments were:
- GABE, GANT, GART, GILT, GOAT, GOUT, GROL, GUPY, GYRO

Example: TOP SECRET//SI-G GUPY

Multiple compartments: TOP SECRET//SI-G GUPY GYRO

[undisclosed]
Classification manuals say there are undisclosed SI compartments which have identifiers of three alphabetical characters. Some documents from such a compartment were declassified in early May 2014. It seems that this compartment is for protecting information related to metadata collection, but is different from STELLARWIND.* It probably contains sub-compartments which are identified by three numeric characters.*

For example: TOP SECRET//SI-XXX 888


STELLARWIND (STLW)
This is a "controlled access signals intelligence program", created under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. It includes information related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) and to the bulk telephony and internet metadata collection by the NSA.* It seems that STLW started as a COMINT compartment* but later on became a hitherto unknown classification category at the same level as SCI and SAP.

Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP)
The markings "TSP" and "Compartmented" were used instead of "STELLARWIND" in briefing materials and documents related to the STELLARWIND program intended for external audiences, such as Congress and the courts. The term "TSP" was initially used in relation to only that portion of the program that was publicly disclosed by president Bush in December 2005.*


UMBRA
This codeword was used since 1968 to protect the most sensitive intercepts of Communication Intelligence (COMINT). The use of this compartment was publicly terminated in 1999, but the Snowden-leaks revealed that NSA is still using it, probably as a registered but unpublished SCI control system for the content of communications collected under authority of EO 12333.


ENDSEAL (EL)
The existance of this control system was declassified in 2014, but the name was already known in 2005. ENDSEAL is for finalized intelligence products, probably based upon information derived from US Navy SIGINT sensors. The raw data collected for ENDSEAL reports are likely handled under a different, still-classified coverterm. ENDSEAL information must always be classified as Special Intelligence (SI) too.*
The control system contains compartments for intelligence products intended for dissemination to Intelligence Community consumers. These compartments are identified by a codeword and can be divided into sub-compartments.

Declassified names of ENDSEAL compartments are:
- ECRU (EU)
- NONBOOK (NK)

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//EL-NK/SI


TALENT KEYHOLE (TK)
This control system is for products of overhead collection systems, such as satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, and contains compartments, which are identified by a classified codeword. The original TALENT compartment was created in the mid-1950s for the U-2. In 1960, it was broadened to cover all national aerial reconnaissance and the KEYHOLE compartment was created for satellite intelligence.

Some former TK subcompartments were:
- CHESS, RUFF, DAFF and ZARF

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//TK-RUFF


RESERVE (RSV)
This control system is for compartments protecting new sources and methods during the research, development, and acquisition process done by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Compartments within RESERVE have an identifier of three alphanumeric characters.* There are no actual examples.

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//RSV-XXX


KLONDIKE (KDK)
This control system is for Geospational Intelligence (GEOINT) produced by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Since 2013, the control system contains compartments, which are identified by a codeword.

Declassified names of KLONDIKE compartments are:
- BLUEFISH (BLFH)
- IDITAROD (IDIT)
- KANDIK (KAND)

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//KDK-IDIT

BLUEFISH (BLFH)
This compartment contains sub-compartments which are identified by up to six alphanumeric characters. There are no actual examples.

Example: TOP SECRET//KDK-BLFH XXXXXX

IDITAROD (IDIT)
This compartment contains sub-compartments which are identified by up to six alphanumeric characters. There are no actual examples.

Example: TOP SECRET//KDK-IDIT XXXXXX

KANDIK (KAND)
This compartment contains sub-compartments which are identified by up to six alphanumeric characters. There are no actual examples.

Example: TOP SECRET//KDK-KAND XXXXXX


? (GG)
This control system is for information derived from Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) and is identified by a codeword that is still classified. It's only known by the abbreviation.*


HUMINT Control System (HCS)
This control system is for protecting Human Intelligence (HUMINT), which is derived from information collected and/or provided by human sources. It has four compartments, two of which were recently revealed.*

Known compartments are:
- HCS-OPERATIONS (HCS-O)
- HCS-PRODUCT (HCS-P)

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//HCS-P

HCS-OPERATIONS (HCS-O)
This compartment is for information related to ongoing clandestine human intelligence operations and therefore they require the ORCON and NOFORN dissemination markings. The information is also restricted from being disseminated outside the CIA. The compartment contains sub-compartments which are identified by up to six alphanumeric characters.* There are no actual examples.

Example: TOP SECRET//HCS-O XXXXXX

HCS-PRODUCT (HCS-P)
This compartment is for sanitized intelligence that is derived from HCS operations with the sensitive sources and methods removed and intended for distribution among Intelligence Community consumers. It contains sub-compartments which are identified by up to six alphanumeric characters.* There are no actual examples.

Example: TOP SECRET//HCS-P XXXXXX


KLAMATH (KLM)
A CIA control system, which in 2003 included the NSA ECI compartments CONQUERER (for joint NSA/CIA clandestine radio frequency operations), LYSERGIC (for NSA efforts to select and prosecute foreign deployed telecommunication cables) and WASHBURN (for a CLANSIG effort to exploit a source in a Middle Eastern location).*

? (CRU)
This control system is identified by a codeword that is still classified and is only known by the abbreviation which was accidentally revealed in 2009.* It's related to highly secret CIA programs.

A compartment of CRU seems to be:
- GREYSTONE (GST)

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//CRU-GST

GREYSTONE (GST)
This compartment is for information about the extraordinary rendition, interrogation and counter-terrorism programs, which the CIA established after the 9/11 attacks. It contains more than a dozen sub-compartments, which are identified by numeric characters.*

Example: TOP SECRET//CRU-GST 001

FOCAL POINT (FP)
This compartment protects CIA support to the military, Special Technical Operations (STOs) and military CIA operations.*

VERDANT (VER)
Former Navy/NSA compartment for SIGINT information.*

PANGRAM (PM)
Former Navy/NSA compartment for information dealing with ocean surveillance.*

MEDITATE (M)
Former Navy/NSA compartment dealing with submarine operations and an IVY BELLS-like operation.*

SPECTRE
Counter-terrorism related compartment, probably no longer in use.*

LOMA
This compartment possibly protects nuclear-related information.*

ICS / PH / ZH
Compartments used by FEMA for continuity of government information and communications. Initiated in 1983, not clear whether these are still used.*

HOLLOW TILE (HT)
SCI control system or Special Access Program for the Air Intelligence Agency.*


SAP compartments

Special Access Programs (SAPs) are created to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive information. Each SAP is identified by a nickname which consists of two unassociated, unclassified words. Additionally, a Special Access Program Central Office (SAPCO) can also assign a single classified codeword to the program. These can be changed regularly. The nickname and the codeword can be abbreviated into an unclassified two or three-letter Program Identifier (PID).

There are over 100 SAPs, with many having numerous compartments and sub-compartments. More than 50 SAPs protect operations and capabilities of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Many others are for military procurement, acquisition, and testing programs. The existance of a SAP can be acknowledged or unacknowledged.*

The classification line for SAP information shows the words SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED, often abbreviated as SAR, followed by the program's nickname or codeword. Examples of program nicknames are BUTTER POPCORN, MEDIAN BELL and SENIOR ICE.

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//SAR-MEDIAN BELL

Multiple SAP's are shown like: TOP SECRET//SAR-MB/SAR-BP


Some examples of actual Special Access Programs are:

YANKEE WHITE
People who have been cleared for this SAP have unfettered access to presidential workspaces that might contain classified information at any level and may also carry a loaded weapon when the president is around. This clearance requires the most extensive background investigation.*


COPPER GREEN / MATCHBOX
This SAP protected a program for training interrogators to use techniques that had been reverse-engineered by the military's agency that trained special operations forces on how to resist torture.


? (CD)
This SAP is identified by a codeword that is still classified and is only known by its abbreviation. It protects all information related to the Air Force Flight Test Center at Groom Lake (aka Area 51).*


Other known Special Access Programs (SAPs) and related Alternative or Compensatory Control Measures (ACCMs) are:
- ADOBE, ANTEMATE, BELL WEATHER, BERNIE, BLACK LIGHT, BLUE MAIL, BLUE ZEPHYR, CAVALRY, CENTENNIAL, CHALK series, CHANNEL series, CITADEL, CLOUD GAP, COMPASS LINK, CONSTANT HELP, CONSTANT PISCES, CONSTANT STAR, COPPER COAST, CORONET PHOENIX, DISTANT PHOENIX, ELEGANT LADY, FIREANT, FOOTPRINT, GALAXY, GENTRY, GIANT CAVE, GIANT DODGE, GRASS BLADE, GREATER SLOPE, GREYHOUND, GULF, GUSTY series, GYPSY series, HAVE DJINN, HAVE FLAG, HAVE TRUMP, HAVE VOID, ISLAND SUN, LEO, LINK series, MALLARD, MERIDIAN, MILKYWAY, MUSTANG, OLYMPIC, OMEGA, OSPREY series, OVERTONE, OXIDE, OZONE, PANTHER series, PAVE RUNNER, PIRATE SWORD, POLO STEP, PROCOMM, PROJECT 19, PROJECT 643, PROJECT 9000, RADIUS, RAVEN, RETRACT series, REWARD, ROSETTA STONE, RUBY, SCATHE series, SCIENCE series, SEA BASS, SEEK CLOCK, SENIOR NEEDLE, SENIOR NIKE, SIERRA, SIT-II, SOFTRING, SPEAR, SUTER, STEEL PUMA, TALON RADIANCE, TAPESTRY, THEME CASTLE, THERMAL VICAR, THIRST WATCHER, THIRSTY SABER, TIGER LAKE, TITRANT RANGER, CAPACITY GEAR, TRACTOR series, UMBRELLA and WHITE KNIGHT.*


SAP compartments and sub-compartments
Special Access Programs can be divided into compartments, sub-compartments and programs. Compartments and sub-compartments can be identified by a two-word unclassified nickname or an alphanumeric designator. They are separated by spaces and they are listed in ascending alphabetic and numeric order. The classification markings do not show the hierarchy beyond the sub-compartment level.

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//SAR-MB A691 D722




Dissemination markings

Dissemination markings or caveats are used to restrict the dissemination of information within only those people who have the appropriate clearance level and the need to know the information. Dissemination markings can also be used to control information which is unclassified. Some markings are used by multiple agencies, others are restricted to use by one agency.


Markings used by multiple agencies:
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)
- SENSITIVE INFORMATION (SINFO, defunct since 2002)
- LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LES)


Intelligence community markings:
- ORIGINATOR CONTROLLED (ORCON) (OC)
- ORIGINATOR CONTROLLED-USGOV (ORCON-USGOV, since 2013)
- CONTROLLED IMAGERY (IMCON) (IMC)
- SOURCES AND METHODS INFORMATION (SAMI, defunct since 2009)
- NO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN) (NF)
- PROPRIETARY INFORMATION (PROPIN) (PR)
- AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO (REL TO) [country trigraph or coalition tetragraph]
- Releasable by Information Disclosure Official (RELIDO)
- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
- DISPLAY ONLY [country trigraph or coalition tetragraph]


National Security Agency (NSA) markings:
- [country trigraph] EYES ONLY

NSA also used SIGINT Exchange Designators, which were gradually replaced by the 'REL TO [...]' marking. Some former SIGINT Exchange Designators were:
- FRONTO
- KEYRUT
- SEABOOT
- SETTEE


National Geospatial intelligence Agency (NGA) markings:
- LIMITED DISTRIBUTION (LIMDIS) (DS)
- RISK SENSITIVE (RSEN)


Department of Defense (DoD) markings:
- NC2-ESI
- SPECIAL CATEGORY (SPECAT, defunct since 2010)


Department of Homeland Security (DHS) markings:
- SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION (SSI)


State Department (DoS) markings:
- EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS) (XD)
- NO DISTRIBUTION (NODIS) (ND)
- SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU)
- SBU NOFORN


Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) markings:
- DEA SENSITIVE (DSEN)


Nuclear weapons related markings:
- RESTRICTED DATA (RD)
- FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA (FRD)
- DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION (DCNI)
- DOE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION (UCNI)
- TRANSCLASSIFIED FOREIGN NUCLEAR INFORMATION (TFNI)

In a classification line this is shown like: SECRET//SI//ORCON

Multiple markings are shown like: SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN


Nuclear weapons related markings
The markings Restricted Data (RD) and Former Restricted Data (FRD) are used by the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy for information about design and operation of nuclear warheads. Both can have the following two additional sub-markings:

- CRITICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN INFORMATION (CNWDI)
- SIGMA (SG, followed by a number between 1 and 20)

In a classification line this is shown like: SECRET//RD-CNWDI

Multiple SIGMA markings are shown like: SECRET//RD-SIGMA 2 4


Internal markings
Some intelligence agencies also use internal markings, indicating that information may not be released or shown to anyone outside that particular agency without proper permission. Internal markings are shown after the dissemination markings at the very end of a classification line.


Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) internal markings:*
- CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
- Administrative Internal Use Only (AIUO)


Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) internal markings:
- SENSITIVE
- JUNE (defunct)
- [undisclosed] *


National Security Agency (NSA) internal markings:
These markings are used to identify a COI or CoI, which stands for Community Of Interest. It seems that this term has recently been replaced by Secure Community of Interest (SCoI). Recently disclosed COI identifiers are:
- BULLRUN
- ENDUE
- NOCON

In a classification line this is shown like: TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN/BULLRUN


Coalition designators
The designators or tetragraphs which are used in the dissemination marking "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO (REL TO)" are listed here:

- ABCA: American, British, Canadian, Australian (and New Zealand Armies’ Program)
- ACGU: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, United States (Four Eyes)
- AFSC: Afghanistan SIGINT Coalition
- BWCS: Biological Weapons Convention States
- CFCK: Combined Forces Command, Korea
- CMFC: Combined Maritime Forces Central
- CMFP: Cooperative Maritime Forces Pacific
- CPMT: Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (for Sudan)
- CWCS: Chemical Weapons Convention States
- ECTF: European Counter-Terrorism Forces
- EFOR: European Union Stabilization Forces in Bosnia
- FVEY: Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US)
- GCTF: Global Counter-Terrorism Forces
- GMIF: Global Maritime Interception Forces
- IESC: International Events Security Coalition
- ISAF: International Security Assistance Forces (for Afghanistan)
- KFOR: Stabilization Forces in Kosovo
- MCFI: Multinational Coalition Forces – Iraq
- MIFH: Multinational Interim Force Haiti
- NACT: North African Counter-Terrorism Forces
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- OSAG: Olympic Security Advisory Group
- UNCK: United Nations Command, Korea


CAPCO
In order to prevent codewords being assigned twice, the Controlled Access Program Coordination Office (CAPCO) lists all codenames and authorized abbreviations of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Access Programs (SAPs) in the Authorized Classification and Control Markings Register or CAPCO list.
In 2013 this responsibility was transferred to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), Special Security Directorate (SSD), Security Markings Program (SMP).


NSA Classification Guides
- Classification Guide for SIGINT material from 1945-1967 (2011)
- Classification Guide for Computer Network Exploitation (2010)
- Classification Guide for Project BULLRUN (2010)
- Classification Guide for Cryptgraphic Modernization (pdf) (2010)
- Classification Guide for FISA, PAA and FAA Activities (pdf) (2009)
- Classification Guide for STELLARWIND (pdf) (2009)
- Classification Guide for ECI PAWLEYS (2006)
- Classification Guide for Cryptanalysis (2005)
- Classification Guide for ECI WHIPGENIE (2004)
- Classification Guide for Cellular communications interception (undated)



Links and Sources
- The latest SCI compartments: My First FOIA Request: ODNI CAPCO v6 + Update
- TheWeek.com: What Edward Snowden didn't disclose
- Wikipedia articles:
  - Classified information in the United States
  - Sensitive Compartmented Information
  - Special access program
- The 2013 Intelligence Community Classification and Control Markings Implementation Manual (pdf)
- The 2013 DoD Special Access Program (SAP) Instruction (pdf)
- The 2012 NRO Review and Redaction Guide (pdf)
- The 2008 DNI Authorized Classification and Control Markings Register (pdf)
- The 2004 listing of Country Code Trigraphs and Coalition Tetragraphs (pdf)
- Article about Security Clearances and Classifications
- Some notes about Sensitive Compartmented Information
- About The 5 secret code words that define our era
- Marc Ambinder & D.B. Grady, Deep State, Inside the Government Secrecy Industry, 2013, p. 164-167.
- William M. Arkin, Code Names, Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World, Steerforth Press, 2005.

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

An NSA eavesdropping case study

(Updated: January 4, 2014)

On September 1, the popular Brazilian television news magazine Fantástico reported about an NSA operation for wiretapping the communications of the presidents of Mexico and Brazil. Fantástico is part of the Globo network, which already disclosed various top secret NSA presentations last July.

Now, the Brazilian magazine showed some new top secret NSA documents, like a powerpoint presentation about the eavesdropping operation, which were all among the thousands of documents which Edward Snowden gave to Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald in June.

Fantástico also published the slides on their website, but as that's only in portuguese, we show these slides too, because they give a nice graphical insight in how the NSA intercepts foreign communications.


The Fantástico news magazine started showing a cover sheet of a presentation which bears the logo of the SIGDEV Strategy and Governance division of the NSA, where SIGDEV stands for SIGINT Development. However, it's not quite clear whether this division is also responsible for the eavesdropping operation which is shown below.


The presentation was prepared in June 2012 by the Scalable Analytics Tradecraft Center (SATC) of NSA. Except for the abbreviation SATC, the full name of this unit was initially unknown, so the Fantástico website assumed it stood for "Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace" (SaTC), but that's actually a program of the US National Science Foundation. Brazilian television briefly showed the name of the author of the presentation, but here we blacked that out.


This slide shows the overall classification level of the presentation: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL. This means the information is Top Secret, contained in the COMINT (Communications Intelligence) control system and is only to be released to the US and it's "Five Eyes" or UKUSA partners: the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.


The presentation starts with two slides, showing the benefits of searching for contacts by using graphs:





The next three slides show some more details of the specific elements of the process:







The Mexican target

The first target of the operation was the then Mexican candidate for the presidency, Enrique Peña Nieto. The information was analysed by NSA unit S2C41 which is the Mexican Leadership Team and is also part of the S2C production line for International Security Issues (ISI).


This slide shows the process of searching for contacts and communications of the mexican president:

1. Selectors, like known e-mail adresses or phone numbers related to EPN (Enrique Peña Nieto) are used as seeds to start the process.

2. The initial seeds lead to 2-hop graphs, apparently based upon metadata which are in the databases mentioned below the graph: MAINWAY is the NSA's database of bulk phone metadata, CIMBRI is seen here for the first time, and could be another kind of metadata database. JEMA probably stands for Joint Enterprise Modeling and Analytics, which is a tool that allows analysts to create more complex analytic scenarios.

3. Next, addresses discovered by creating the contact graphs can act as selectors for collecting SMS messages. For this the MAINWAY database is used too, just like ASSOCIATION, which, according to the Fantástico website, filters text messages (SMS) to mobile phones.

4. Finally, these messages go to DISHFIRE, which is NSA's database for text messages and can be searched for certain keywords.


This slide shows two "interesting messages", proving that content of text messages was collected. In the two quoted passages, the Mexican presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto is in discussion with some of the designated ministers of his future government. Parts of the messages are blacked out by Brazilian media.


The Brazilian target

The second target of the operation were the Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff and her key advisers. The information was analysed by NSA unit S2C42 which is focussed on the Brazilian leadership. This unit is part of the NSA's S2C production line for International Security.


This slide shows the process of searching for contacts and communications of the Brazilian president. The intelligence gathering starts with a few DNI Selectors (like e-mail or IP addresses) which act as seeds growing into a 2-hop contact graph. This graph shows all the addresses which had 2-hop or 2-step contacts with the original seed addresses.

Below the graph is the word SCIMITAR, seen here for the first time, which could be a tool to create such contact graphs, or maybe a database containing metadata from which these contacts can be derived.


From the 2-hop contact graph NSA apparently discovered new selectors (e-mail or IP addresses) associated with the Brazilian president and her advisers. Another slide, which was not published, is said to show all the names associated with the colored dots in this graph.


The presentation concludes that there was a successful cooperation between the mysterious unit SATC and the Latin American units from the S2C International Security division. This led to a successful implementation of contact filtering by using graphs, resulting in the interception of communications of high-profile, security-savvy Brazilian and Mexican targets.


This presentation gives insight in a specific eavesdropping operation, but also gives a good idea of how NSA is collecting information from the internet in general, for example through PRISM and various other programs which gather data from internet backbone cables.

Allthough the presentation is clarifying, it could also have been published without mentioning the specific targets involved. Showing that this operation targeted the presidents of Mexico and Brazil did not serve a public interest, but unnecessarily damaged the relationship between the United States and both countries.

Glenn Greenwald seemed to justify the publication by saying that the presentation proved that NSA was also intercepting the content of phone calls and e-mail messages. After earlier disclosures, the US had said that they only collect bulk metadata from Brazil and no content. But of course this statement only applied to ordinary citizens, as eavesdropping on foreign political and military leaders is generally considered to be a legal activity of (signals) intelligence agencies.

Greenwald, who lives in Rio de Janeiro, also said that "most of the spying they [= the US] do does not have anything to do with national security, it is to obtain an unfair advantage over other nations in their industrial and commerce economic agreements". But with this motive he also acts more in the national interest of Brazil, or at least like an activist, than as a journalist working for the public interest.

(Updated by rearranging the slide order and some related minor corrections - see the comment below)


Links and Sources
- Globo.com: Documentos revelam esquema de agência dos EUA para espionar Dilma
- Cryptome.org: Translation in English
- The slides with Portuguese description: Veja os documentos ultrassecretos que comprovam espionagem a Dilma
- Bloomberg.com: U.S. Spied on Presidents of Brazil and Mexico, Globo Reports

Friday, August 30, 2013

The red phone that was NOT on the Hotline


Today, it's exactly 50 years ago that the famous Washington-Moscow Hotline became operational. Allthough this link has always been for written communications only, many people think there are red telephones on the Hotline, as this is often depicted in popular culture.

One wide-spread image is from the article about the Hotline on the online encyclopedia Wikipedia. It shows a non-dial red telephone which is on display in the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum in Atlanta, Georgia:



(photo uploaded to Wikimedia by user Piotrus under CC-BY-SA)


Much of the confusion about the real purpose of this phone was due to the fact that in this picture, the text on the plate below the phone wasn't readable. But now, upon request of this weblog, the curator of the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum kindly provided the text, which reads as follows:

RED PHONE
During Jimmy Carter’s presidency, the “red phone” was a hotline to the Kremlin in Moscow. A U.S. president could pick up the phone and speak directly to Soviet leaders in times of crisis.
Reproduction

The text is about a red phone used for the Hotline, but more important is the fact that the telephone which is on display, is just a reproduction. This is also confirmed by the curator, who said that this phone is a prop that the exhibition designer wanted to use.


Now it's clear that the actual red phone in the picture was never used on the Hotline between Washington and Moscow, nor on any other secure telephone network (allthough red phone sets were regularly used for predecessors of the Defense Red Switch Network, which is the main secure voice network of the US military).

The picture on Wikipedia shows just an ordinary phone set, like the ones that are quite commonly used for emergency telephone lines of any kind which don't require a dialing capability. Probably because the designer of the exhibition at the Jimmy Carter Museum also thought there were red telephones on the Hotline, such a common phone set was used to represent this.

For people visiting the museum it must have looked like a confirmation of their idea of the red phone hotline. When someone uploaded a picture of this phone to Wikipedia in March 2011, it soon found its way to articles about the Washington-Moscow Hotline in eleven languages, most of them erroneously saying the Hotline also having a voice capability. It was only after research done for this weblog, which resulted in an extensive article about the Hotline last year, that some of the Wikipedia articles were corrected.



What the Washington-Moscow Hotline looks nowadays: the terminal room
at the Pentagon showing the secure computer link equipment
(photo: www.army.mil, 2013)


Wednesday, August 28, 2013

The 50th anniversary of the Washington-Moscow Hotline

(Updated: September 16, 2013)

This Friday, August 30, it's exactly 50 years ago that a direct communication link between the United States and Russia became operational. This Washington-Moscow Hotline is one of the most famous top level communications systems in modern history.

Many people think the Washington-Moscow Hotline uses red phone sets, but that's a myth. The Hotline never was a telephone line as it started with teletype terminals, later replaced by facsimile equipment. Since 2008 the Hotline uses secure e-mail, as can be seen in this most recent picture of the Hotline terminal in the Pentagon:



The Washington-Moscow Hotline terminal room at the Pentagon, 2013
Presidential communicator Navy Chief Petty Officer John E. Kelley (seated) and
senior presidential translator Lt. Col. Charles Cox man the hotline terminal
(photo: www.army.mil)


For the full history and more unique historical pictures of the Hotline, see our updated story from last year: The Washington-Moscow Hotline


A small event to celebrate the 50th anniversary will be held this Thursday, August 29, at Fort Detrick in Maryland, where the satellite ground station of the American end of the Hotline is situated. The event includes as guest speakers: the former American ambassador, Jack Foust Matlock, Jr. and a son of the former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Dr. Sergei Khrushchev.


An entirely edible, satellite dish-shaped cake
to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Hotline
(photo: USAG VI)


There seems to be no commemoration involving the American and Russian presidents. Maybe this is due to the fact that the relationship between both countries has troubled after Edward Snowden, who leaked many top secret documents from the NSA, was granted asylum in Russia recently.


Links
Some articles about the 50th anniversary of the Hotline:
- Detrick.army.mil: World Leader Hotline At Fort Detrick Celebrates 50 Years
- Army.mil: Hotline, now 50 years old, continues to promote dialog with Russians
- FoxNews.com: 50 years later, hotline to Washington-Moscow hotline still relevant
- RussianReport: Washington – Moscow “hotline” turns 50 years old this month
- Itar-tass.com: "Горячая линия" связи между Москвой и Вашингтоном отметила полувековой юбилей
- Redstar.ru: На связи – Белый дом

Saturday, August 24, 2013

NSA also has arrangements with foreign internet providers

(Updated: January 25, 2014)

Last Tuesday, August 20, the Wall Street Journal came with a big story with new details about the NSA surveillance programs. The article claims that NSA has the capacity to reach roughly 75% of all US internet traffic that flows through domestic fiber-optic cables. However, this was strongly denied by the NSA

The 75% claim got a lot of attention, but most media apparently oversaw a section later on in the article, which reveals a far more sensitive NSA collection method:

"The NSA started setting up Internet intercepts well before 2001, former intelligence officials say. Run by NSA's secretive Special Services Office, these types of programs were at first designed to intercept communications overseas through arrangements with foreign Internet providers, the former officials say. NSA still has such arrangements in many countries, particularly in the Middle East and Europe, the former officials say."

Documents which were recently leaked by Edward Snowden already confirmed that the NSA collects internet data from telecommunication cables going through the United States. But now we learn that also foreign internet providers are cooperating with NSA in order to intercept foreign communications.

For Americans it may be embarrassing that NSA is tapping into domestic internet cables, but for people elsewhere in the world it must be even more embarrassing that their telecommunications provider might have some secret agreement with a foreign intelligence agency.

Here we will combine this with a number of other recent stories and this shows us that NSA and its British counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), have arrangements with a number of big American and British telecommunications companies, and also with an unknown number of foreign internet providers. These are cooperating because they are required by law and both NSA and GCHQ are paying them for the expenses. The result is a global internet surveillance network.



The doughnut-shaped building of GCHQ in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire.


Cooperating with GCHQ

The names of the companies cooperating with GCHQ were published on August 2 by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and the NDR television channel. As these are smaller regional media, it seems that The Guardian didn't dare to publish these names themselves. Both media were given access to some top secret GCHQ documents from 2009, partly from an internal system called GC-Wiki, which mention the following telecommunications providers (meanwhile some have merged) and their codenames:
- Verizon Business (DACRON)
- British Telecom (REMEDY)
- Vodafone Cable (GERONTIC)
- Global Crossing (PINNAGE)
- Level 3 (LITTLE)
- Viatel (VITREOUS)
- Interoute (STREETCAR)

GCHQ has clandestine agreements with these seven companies, described in one document as "intercept partners", in order to give the agency access to their network of undersea cables. The companies are paid for logistical and technical assistance and British Telecom even developed software and hardware to intercept internet data. At GCHQ this collection effort is conducted under the "Mastering the Internet" component of the TEMPORA program.

The identity of the participating companies was regarded as extremely sensitive, in official documents referred to as "Exceptionally Controlled Information" (ECI), with the company names replaced with the codewords. Disclosure of the names would not only cause "high-level political fallout", but would also be very damaging for the trustworthiness of the companies.



One of the doors of room 641A in the building of AT&T in San Francisco,
where the NSA had a secret internet tapping device installed,
which was revealed by an AT&T technician in 2006.


In reaction to these disclosures, Vodafone and Verizon said that they comply with the laws of all the countries in which they operate cables and that they won't disclose any customer data in any jurisdiction unless legally required to do so. This is the same kind of reply some of the US internet companies gave regarding to their alleged involvement in the PRISM program.


Tapping the internet backbone

Together, the seven companies operate a huge share of the high-capacity undersea fibre-optic cables that make up the backbone of the internet's architecture. The German media also noted that these companies also run some important internet nodes in Germany, and for example Interoute owns and operates Europe's largest cloud services platform.

We do not know how many of the internet cables and nodes of these providers have collection and filtering devices attached. Former NSA official and whistleblower William Binney gives quite a large number of major points in the global fiber optic networks where there would likely be Narus, Verint or similar intercepting devices. In this article there's a list of the most likely surveillance nodes on the networks of AT&T, Verizon, BT Group and Deutsche Telekom - situated all over the world.

The Guardian confirms that in 2012 GCHQ had tapped more than 200 fibre-optic cables and was able to process data from at least 46 of them at a time. The collected metadata is stored for up to 30 days, while the content of communications is typically stored for three days.

On August 28, new reports by the Italian paper L'Espresso and the international website of the German paper Süddeutsche Zeitung revealed the names of at least 14 undersea fiber-optic internet cables which GCHQ is tapping:

- TAT-14, connecting the United States with the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark
- Atlantic Crossing 1, linking the USA and the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany
- SeaMeWe3, which connects Europe, Asia and the Middle East
- SeaMeWe4, linking Europe, North Africa and Asia
- FLAG Europe Asia (FEA), linking Europe to Japan through the Middle East and India
- FLAG Atlantic-1, linking New York with France and England
- Circe North, connecting the United Kingdom with Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands
- Circe South, idem
- Solas, between the United Kingdom and Ireland across the Irish Sea
- UK-France 3
- UK-Netherlands 14
- Ulysses 1 and 2, running between Dover and Calais, resp. IJmuiden and Lowestoft
- Yellow/AC-2, connecting New York with Bude in the United Kingdom
- Pan European Crossing (PEC), linking the United Kingdom, Belgium, and France



Overview of the undersea fiber-optic cables
Click for an interactive map!


The existance of internet tapping points outside the US and the UK was confirmed in a report by The Independent from August 23. It says GCHQ runs a secret internet-monitoring station at an undisclosed location in the Middle East to intercept and process vast quantities of emails, telephone calls and web traffic on behalf of Western intelligence agencies.

The station is able to tap into and extract data from the underwater fibre-optic cables passing through the region. All of the messages and data passed back and forth on the cables is copied into giant computer storage buffers and then sifted for data of special interest. These data are then processed and passed to GCHQ in Cheltenham and shared with the NSA.


Network Security Agreements

On July 7, The Washington Post published about a "Network Security Agreement" between the US government and the fiber-optic network operator Global Crossing, which in 2003 was being sold to a foreign company. Global Crossing was later sold to Colorado-based Level 3 Communications, which owns many international fiber-optic cables, and the 2003 agreement was replaced by a new one (pdf) in 2011.

According to the Post, this agreement became a model for similar arrangements with other companies. These ensure that when US government agencies seek access to the massive amounts of data flowing through their networks, the companies have systems in place to provide it securely. The 2011 agreement with Level 3 clearly says that all domestic communication cables shall pas through a facility from which lawful electronic surveillance can be conducted:



The bottom line here is in the word "lawful". As long as information requests by NSA or GCHQ are lawful, the internet providers will assist in gathering the required data. They even have to.


Corporate Partner Access program

Just like GCHQ, NSA is also paying telecommunication companies. This came out when on August 30, The Washington Post published parts of the highly classified US Intelligence Budget. This revealed that NSA’s Special Source Operations (SSO) division runs a project called Corporate Partner Access, which involves major US telecommunications providers to tap into "high volume circuit and packet-switched networks".

For the fiscal year 2013 this program was expected to cost $ 278 million, down nearly one-third from its peak of $ 394 million in 2011. Among the possible costs covered by this amount are "network and circuit leases, equipment hardware and software maintenance, secure network connectivity, and covert site leases". The total of 278 million breaks down as follows for specific programs:
- BLARNEY: $ 65.96 million
- FAIRVIEW: $ 94.74 million
- STORMBREW: $ 46.04 million
- OAKSTAR: $ 9.41 million

A final $ 56.6 million is for "Foreign Partner Access", but according to The Washington Post it's not clear whether these are for foreign companies, foreign governments or other foreign entities.

The article says that telecommunications companies generally charge to comply with surveillance requests from state, local and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This simplifies the government’s access to surveillance and the payments cover for the costs of buying and installing new equipment, along with a reasonable profit, which makes it also profitable for the companies to cooperate with NSA and other agencies.

Some more details about collecting data with the help of foreign facilities came from NSA slides shown in the background of a Brazilian television report on September 8, 2013. These slides mention at least three sub-programs of OAKSTAR for collecting phone and internet communications "through a foreign access point":
- MONKEYROCKET
- SHIFTINGSHADOW
- ORANGECRUSH
The latter program is specified as a "Foreign access point through PRIMECANE, and 3rd party partner" (see below).

 



2nd and 3rd party countries

Similar arrangements with telecommunication providers can be expected in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as the signals intelligence agencies of these countries have a very close information sharing relationship with GCHQ and NSA under the UKUSA-Agreement from 1946. Regarding signals intelligence these countries count as 2nd party allies of the NSA.

One step below, there's a group of around 30 countries that are considered to be 3rd party partners. According to the Snowden-leaks Germany, France, Austria, Denmark, Belgium and Poland are among them.* Probably Norway, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Israel, Taiwan and South Africa are 3rd party partners too.*

Update #1:
New documents show that Sweden is a 3rd Party partner of NSA since 1954.

Update #2:
Another disclosed NSA document has confirmed that France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are 3rd Party partners of NSA and that they are part of a group called SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) or 14-Eyes.

As the Wall Street Journal article says that the foreign internet providers are "particularly in the Middle East and Europe", this reminds of a special relationship the United States has with a number of countries in particularly these regions. We know them by the fact that they have a so-called Defense Telephone Link with the US:

- In Europe: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.
- In the Middle East: Bahrein, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Most of these countries are small, dependent on US military support and therefore often willing to cooperate with US intelligence agencies. Of course this doesn't necessarily mean that in all of these countries the NSA has agreements with local internet providers, but the list may give an indication of where we can expect cooperating companies. Having secret arrangements with a foreign intelligence agency is a highly sensitive and tricky business, so internet providers have to be covered by their government.

> See for the latest: NSA's foreign partnerships


The new way of intercepting

For the NSA these arrangements with foreign internet providers make good sense. Before the Internet-age, NSA could intercept many communications on its own, for example by placing taps at underwater telephony cables and intercepting satellite transmissions and microwave links. These were the long-distance connections for the public switched telephone network, which also carried most of the early internet traffic.


The 20 feet/6 meter and 6 tons tapping device for a Soviet cable in
the Sea of Okhotsk, which was placed in the 1970's under operation Ivy Bells
and was discovered and removed by the Soviets in 1981.


With the rapid expansion of the internet after the year 2000, the copper cables and satellite and microwave links have been replaced by fiber-optic cables, which are far more difficult to intercept. NSA is reportedly capable of placing taps at underwater fiber cables, but these are of course very cumbersome and costly operations.

Therefore, the way to go was to place taps at locations where the fiber-optic communications are switched. For the internet, much of the switching occurs at relatively few sites, but here intercepting has to be done with the help, or at least the knowledge, of the companies who are operating these sites.

Before 2001, NSA was only authorized to intercept communications with both ends being foreign. So the first internet providers to cooperate with had to be outside the US. But due to the very nature of the internet, NSA soon found out that it was increasingly difficult to keep foreign and domestic communications separated.

For that reason president George W. Bush secretly authorized NSA to also wiretap international communications where just one party is believed to be affiliated with terrorism. Under this new authority NSA could now also involve American telecommunication providers, first those providing hardware transmissions (AT&T, Verizon, etc) and later companies offering the software for today's communications (Microsoft, Google, Apple, etc).


Nothing really new

Now, NSA and its UKUSA partners are cooperating with a range of national and foreign internet providers, which gives them access to the main internet cables and switching points all around the world. This is just like they operated the ECHELON network with listening stations worldwide, intercepting the former satellite communications.

For some people all this may sound like Snowden's claim about the NSA being able to eavesdrop on every conversation of everyone in the world, but there's no evidence for that. NSA does want access to as many communication channels as possible, but only for gathering information about enemies of the United States, not about ordinary people. Given the enormous amount of data traffic, NSA will just do everything to gather that info as focussed and efficiently as possible - more about that next time.

(This article was updated with info about the Level 3 agreement, the British base in the Middle East, the names of the fiber-optic cables and the budget for cooperation of telecom providers)


Links and Sources

- NY Times: N.S.A. May Have Penetrated Internet Cable Links
- Wall Street Journal: New Details Show Broader NSA Surveillance Reach - still availabe here
- Süddeutsche Zeitung: Snowden enthüllt Namen der spähenden Telekomfirmen
- The Guardian: BT and Vodafone among telecoms companies passing details to GCHQ
- The Washington Post: Agreements with private companies protect U.S. access to cables’ data for surveillance
- Süddeutsche Zeitung: British Officials Have Far-Reaching Access To Internet And Telephone Communications
- Wikipedia listing: List of international submarine communications cables

Friday, July 26, 2013

NSA says there are three different PRISMs

(Updated: July 28, 2013)

Yesterday, German media wrote about an official letter from the NSA, which was sent to the German government to clarify some misconceptions about PRISM. This because German media and politics were heavily confused after it became clear that there's more than one program named PRISM.

The NSA letter explains what the PRISM data collection program is about and then confirms that this program is different from a more common military web tool called "Planning tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management" (PRISM).

Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that there's even a third program called PRISM. In this case the name stands for "Portal for Real-time Information Sharing and Management" and it's apparently an internal NSA information sharing program. It was unknown until now, probably because it's used in the NSA's highly sensitive Information Assurance Directorate (IAD).


Initially: two different PRISMs

Almost immediately after The Guardian and The Washington Post came with their disclosure of PRISM on June 6, some people googled and found out there were also a number of other programs called PRISM. Because both papers failed to clarify the precise nature of PRISM, it seemed that the program could have been the same as a more common application called "Planning tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management" (PRISM). We examined this in an earlier article.

However, this option of both PRISMs being one and the same had to be abandoned after The Washington Post published four new slides from the PRISM-presentation on June 29. These slides presented many new details and also proved that the PRISM which collects data from internet companies is different from the PRISM planning tool. The first operates on the national intelligence level, and the latter is used at a tactical level by the various military commands. These new insights were discussed on this weblog in this article and graphically shown in this figure:



Comparing the PRISM data collection program and the PRISM planning tool
(click for a bigger picture)



Confusion in Germany

On July 17, the German tabloid BILD came with big headlines claiming that troops of the German federal defense forces (Bundeswehr) in Afghanistan already knew about PRISM in 2011. This suggested that the German government was lying, because earlier it had denied all accusations of knowing anything about the PRISM program as unveiled by Edward Snowden.

BILD found "PRISM" mentioned in a confidential e-mail, which the ISAF Joint Command Headquarters in Kabul sent to all Regional Commands (RC) in Afghanistan on September 1, 2011:



Screenshot of the front page of the German tabloid BILD,
as shown on the German television channel ZDF


This publication caused a lot of discussion, so already on the same day, spokesmen from both the German foreign intelligence agency BND and the German defense forces declared that there are two different PRISM programs: the first one being the program unveiled by Edward Snowden, and the second one being a "computer supported US communications system", which is used in Afghanistan "to coordinate US reconaissance systems and to present collected information" - as we can read from this letter of the assistant Defense minister:



Screenshot of a letter from the assistent German Defense minister to the German parliament,
explaining the PRISM confusion, as shown on the German television channel ZDF


Both officials didn't say that the full name of this second PRISM is "Planning tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management", making it harder to proof that both programs are different.

Again this shows severe deficiencies in informing the public and in research by the media. The BILD-article is pure sensationalism. Simply googling key words from sections of the e-mail like "collection management shop", "COMINT nominations [...] must be resubmitted into PRISM" and "SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority" would have rapidly pointed to the PRISM planning tool.

As described earlier, the second PRISM is a so-called tasking tool, which is used to request the intelligence information which is needed for military operations. As such it's the core application of the military intelligence collection management. This PRISM planning tool runs over the intelligence community's JWICS and the military's SIPRNet networks. It was developed by SAIC, first mentioned in 2002 and since then in many job descriptions on the internet.

Only very few media did this kind of research and found out that there are really two different PRISM programs. We can see for example one article at Netzpolitik.org, which connects a bit too many things, and another one at Golem.de, which is based upon research by this weblog.


A letter from the NSA

On July 25, the website of the German newspaper WELT cited a letter which the NSA sent to the German federal government to answer official questions about PRISM. The letter says the media is "confusing two separate and distinct PRISM programs" and continues with explaining what the first program is about:

"The first PRISM pertains to the foreign intelligence collection being conducted under Section 702 of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This is the program that has caught the most attention of our publics, politicians and the media.
This is not bulk collection, and there are restrictions on how long the information can be retained. It is carefully targeted in accordance with a public law and requires court approval and supervision.
A fundamental, protective requirement of FISA is that it restricts the ability of the U.S. Government to obtain the contents of communications from communications service providers by requiring that the court find that the government has an appropriate and documented foreign intelligence purpose, such as the prevention of terrorism, hostile cyber activities or nuclear proliferation."


Screenshot of the letter from the NSA to the German government,
as shown on the German television channel ZDF


According to German media, the NSA letter continues by saying that the second PRISM program is a tool, which is used by US troops in Afghanistan to order and search intelligence information. This is the program mentioned in the ISAF e-mail from 2011 and is clearly the Planning tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management (PRISM), allthough that's not only used in Afghanistan, but also at other US military commands.

Surprisingly and all by itself, the NSA added that there's even a third program called PRISM, which is fully independent from the two PRISM programs mentioned before. In this case the name is also an acronym, which stands for "Portal for Real Time Information Sharing and Management" and the program is apparently used for internal real-time exchange of information.

By now we already have quite some information about the first PRISM program, we know there's a clear distinction from the second PRISM tool and we even learned about a third PRISM. Nonetheless, German opposition leaders said they still hardly know what PRISM is all about, but this seems to be mainly for political ends, as Germany is facing general elections in September.


Now: three different PRISMs

It seems that NSA revealed the existance of the third PRISM program for the very first time, as it never appeared somewhere online before. If we google its full name, the only results are the recent German news reports. The German magazine Der Spiegel came with another quote, which seems to suggest that this third NSA tool "tracks and queries requests pertaining to our Information Assurance Directorate".

If that's correct, it could explain why we never heard of this program. The NSA's Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) is a very secretive division, because it's responsible for safeguarding US government and military secrets by implementing sophisticated encryption techniques.

Probably the most remarkable thing about the new "Portal for Real-time Information Sharing and Management" is not its function, which seems pretty obvious, but the fact that there are three programs with exactly the same name.

But from what we know by now, it also becomes clear that each program is used for different purposes and in different environments: the PRISM data collecting program is part of NSA's Signals Intelligence division, the PRISM planning tool is used for military intelligence and the PRISM information sharing portal in the Information Assurance division of the NSA.

Finally, here's a short summary of all three different PRISM programs:

1. PRISM
This is a codeword for an NSA project of collecting information about foreign targets from data of nine major US internet companies. This program started in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden in June 2013.

2. Planning tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
This is a web tool used by US military intelligence to send tasking instructions to data collection platforms deployed to military operations. This program is not very secret and was first mentioned in 2002.

3. Portal for Real-time Information Sharing and Management (PRISM)
This is an internal NSA program for real-time sharing of information, apparently in the NSA's Information Assurance Directorate. Its existance was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.



Tuesday, July 16, 2013

New slides about NSA collection programs

(Updated: November 30, 2014)

Over the last month, the publication of various slides of a powerpoint presentation about the top secret NSA collection program PRISM caused almost worldwide media attention. Less known is that a number of new slides about other NSA collection programs were published on July 6 by the Brazilian newspaper O Globo.

These and a few other slides were also shown on Brazilian televion, combined with an interview with Guardian-columnist Glenn Greenwald, who lives in Rio de Janeiro. Screenshots of some of the slides shown on Brazilian television became available on Flickr (see Links and Sources). On July 21, the German magazine Der Spiegel published some extra details about the XKEYSCORE program.






FAIRVIEW-slides

Brazilian television and the O Globo website presented a whole new series of four slides from what seems to be a presentation about the FAIRVIEW program or maybe the broader "collection of communications on fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past", which was called "Upstream" in one of the PRISM-slides.

The first slide (below) shows the logos of the NSA and its Special Source Operations (SSO) unit, and a map representing "1 Day view of authorized (FAA ONLY) DNI traffic volumes to North Korea within FAIRVIEW environment". As DNI stands for Digital Network Intelligence, this map apparently shows internet traffic to North Korea, as traced by the FAIRVIEW program.


According to O Globo these maps show the amount of exchanged messages and phone calls (allthough DNI only refers to internet traffic) by various countries in the world with North Korea, Russia, Pakistan and Iran. Below we see DNI traffic to Pakistan on March 4 and 5, 2012:


A third slide shows a list op "Top 20 Pakistani domains (.pk)" which where apparently tracked between February 15, 2012 and March 11, 2012:


A fourth slide shows some lines with names of collection managers of OAKSTAR, BLARNEY and what appears to be the STORMBREW and (the hitherto unknown) OCELOT programs (Update: newly disclosed slides show that the latter word is actually MADCAPOCELOT). Brazilian television showed this slide uncensored with the names visible, but here we blacked them out:


According to former NSA official Thomas Drake FAIRVIEW is a highly classified program for tapping into the world’s intercontinental fiber-optic cables. It acts as an "umbrella program" with other programs underneath it. One of them is BLARNEY, which is a program to access internet data at key junctions and is facilitated by arrangements with commercial cable companies and internet servce providers.

According to Drake, "BLARNEY is to the international Internet space as PRISM is to the domestic". FAIRVIEW is apparently also the method through which the NSA receives the information it has collected, essentially co-opting the fiber optic cables to transmit the data back to the agency to be analyzed by data mining programs.

> See for many more: Slides about NSA's Upstream collection



FORNSAT-slide

The Brazilian television also showed one slide from a presentation which wasn't mentioned or seen earlier. The only information we have, is the slide itself and what the O Globo website tells about it:


The slide is titled PRIMARY FORNSAT COLLECTION OPERATIONS, and the O Globo website says it shows a network of 16 facilities for intercepting transmissions from foreign satellites. The slide shows markings in blue and green, where blue represents "US Sites" and green "2nd Party" for intercepting locations run by partner signals intelligence agencies of the UKUSA Agreement.

US Sites:
- JACKKNIFE, Yakima (US)
- TIMBERLINE, Sugar Grove (US)
- CORALINE, Sabena Seca (Puerto Rico)
- SCS, Brasilia (Brazil)
- MOONPENNY, Harrogate (Great Britain)
- GARLICK, Bad Aibling (Germany)
- LADYLOVE, Misawa (Japan)
- LEMONWOOD, Thailand
- SCS, New Delhi (India)

2nd Party Sites:
- CARBOY, Bude (Great Britain)
- SOUNDER, Ayios Nikolaos (Cyprus)
- SNICK, near Seeb (Oman)
- SCAPEL, Nairobi (Kenya)
- STELLAR, Geraldton (Australia)
- SHOAL BAY, Darwin (Australia)
- IRONSAND, Waihopai (New Zealand)

Most of these locations were part of the ECHELON satellite intercept program. The NSA station at Bad Aibling in Germany was closed down in 2004 and turned over to the German foreign intelligence agency BND. At the same time, a joint NSA-BND unit was established at the nearby Mangfall Barracks.

According to Snowden, the NSA personnel from this unit maintain their own communications hub connected to the NSA headquarters. This cooperation between NSA and BND is based on a Memorandum of Agreement dated April 28, 2002.

The SCS sites in Brasilia and New Delhi are units of the Special Collection Service, a joint CIA/NSA program to collect information through covert listening posts based in US embassies in foreign capitals.

Update:
An article showing a better version of the map says that it's from 2002, which explains why it shows the stations at Bad Aibling and Sabena Seca, both of which have since closed.

> See for the 2012 situation: NSA's global interception network - FORNSAT



PRISM-slides

Already nine slides from the presentation about the PRISM data collection program were published on the websites of The Guardian and The Washington Post. On this weblog we also discussed the first five slides and the following four slides, which were additionally published by the Post.

The Brazilian television showed two new pictures, the first is the fifth slide published by The Guardian, but only showing the world map with fiber optic cables, and without the text balloons about "Upstream" and "PRISM" collection methods, which apparently show up after clicking the original powerpoint presentation:


The slide which is below was not published earlier. Just like the previous slide, this one is also about "FAA702 Operations", which means operations under section 702 of the FISA Amendment Act (FAA) of 2008. The slide shows the same world map with fiber-optic cables and is hardly readable, but according to Wikipedia, the subheader reads "Collection only possible under FAA702 Authority" and the program name FAIRVIEW is the central cyan colored box. Maybe the codenames of other programs are in the yellow box at the right side:


An eleventh slide of the PRISM presentation appeared on the website of O Globo, some days after the previous slides were shown on television. This slide is titled "A Week in the Life of PRISM Reporting" and shows some samples of reporting topics from early February 2013:


It seems the bottom part of this slide was blacked out by Brazilian media, as the Indian
paper The Hindu disclosed that this slide also mentions "politics, space, nuclear" as
topics under the header "India", and also information from Asian and African
countries is contributing to a total of "589 End product Reports".

These lists show that PRISM is used for collecting data about the usual strategical and tactical targets and not about ordinary people, as most of the media reports suggest.

> See for all known PRISM slides: What is known about NSA's PRISM program

 


XKEYSCORE-slides

Brazilian television showed a whole new set of slides about the XKEYSCORE program. According to O Globo, XKEYSCORE detects the nationality of foreigners by analysing the language used within intercepted emails, which the paper claims has been applied to Latin America and specifically to Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Mexico.

In total, O Globo showed four slides about the XKEYSCORE program, which are classified as TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL. This means this information can be shared with signals intelligence agencies from Australia, Canada, Great Britain and New Zealand, which are cooperating under the so called UKUSA Agreement.

XKEYSCORE collects data with the help of over 700 servers based in "US and allied military and other facilities as well as US embassies and consulates" in several dozen countries. These locations are shown on the slide below:


The next slide shows how the collected data of so-called sessions are processed by separating them into different communication information, which are stored in various databases:


According to O Globo the XKEYSCORE can also track people by localities when they are using Google Maps:


This slide is follewed by one showing a map of Afghanistan and surrounding countries with a lot of coloured marking points, without any clarification of what they represent:


According to new information published by the German magazine Der Spiegel (pdf) on July 21, the slides about X-KEYSCORE are from a presentation dated February 25, 2008. It's said that, starting with the metadata, the program is able to retroactively reveal any terms a targeted person has typed into a search engine like Google or Google Maps. Furthermore, there's a buffer storage capable of storing a "full take" of intercepted raw data for several days. X-KEYSCORE can also to monitor user activity in near real time, as well as showing "anomalies" in internet traffic.

In December 2012, XKEYSCORE gathered around 180 million data sets from Germany alone. Apparently the German federal security service BfV was equipped with XKEYSCORE to "expand their ability to support NSA as we jointly prosecute CT [counterterrorism] targets" and the German foreign intelligence agency BND was tasked with instructing the BfV on how to use the program.

On July 25, the directors of the German intelligence agencies briefed members of the German parliamentary intelligence oversight committee about the various NSA programs. They said that XKEYSCORE is used by the BND since 2007, that BfV uses a test version since 2012, and that this program is not for collecting data, but only for analysing them. The director of the BfV even gave a partial demonstration of the test version of XKEYSCORE.

Update:
On July 31, The Guardian published a full presentation about XKEYSCORE, which confirms that this program is not for data collection, but for data analysing.

(Updated on September 22 with the eleventh PRISM slide and on October 23 with a better FornSat slide)



Links and Sources
- Brazilian television report: La CIA y la NSA espiaron mediante satélites desde Brasil & Slides
- O Globo slides: Mapa mostra volume de rastreamento do governo americano
- Cryptome translations: NSA Email and Phone Tracking Programs
- Screenshots on Flickr: NSA Hawaii in USB Made in China
- DailyDot.com: Forget PRISM: FAIRVIEW is the NSA's project to "own the Internet"
- Der Spiegel-article: 'Prolific Partner': German Intelligence Used NSA Spy Program

See also: Boundless Informant NSA data-mining tool – four key slides